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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND TAX
NEUTRALITY: TAXING THE INVESTMENT
COMPONENT OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION
Eric D. Chason*

INTRODUCTION

Corporate executives and investment fund managers are not only
paid more than the rest of us, but they are paid differently as well. Yes,
they get semi-monthly paychecks and 401(k) matches. But the titans of
American capitalism receive the bulk of their oft-criticized
compensation through stock options and plans of deferred
compensation.' The size of executive pay packages has attracted steady
and sustained attention from Congress and scholars for years, focused
ever more sharply by the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 2 Tax
scholarship in particular has often focused on whether Congress could
and should control the size of executive pay through the Internal
Revenue Code. 3 Until recently, traditional tax policy concerns, like the

* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law. I would like to thank Eric Kades, John Lee, Kirk Stark, David Weisbach, George Yin, and
Ed Zelinsky for their comments.
I See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823,
844-48 (2005).
2 Cf Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 801, 122 Stat.
3765, 3929-31 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 457A (West 2010)) (disallowing deferral for certain
classes of deferred compensation); id. § 302(a), 122 Stat. at 3803-05 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §
162 (West 2010)) (disallowing deductions for executive compensation paid by firms participating
in the Troubled Assets Relief Program, or TARP); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115,517-21 (2009) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221
(West 2010) (further limiting executive compensation by TARP participant firms).
3 Articles exploring the taxation of executive compensation from a governance perspective
include Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law in Regulating Hostile
Corporate Takeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. FLA. L.
REv. 789, 825-27 (1988); Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the
Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (2007); James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and
Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971
(1992); Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to
Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 138, 141 (2002); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique
of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881,35 VJLL. L. REv. 131 (1990).
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timing of income, have received less attention. 4
The timing of income from executive compensation reemerged as a
prime consideration after the passage of§ 409A of the Code in 2004. 5
Section 409A addressed deferred compensation plans, which allow
executives to earn compensation in one year but pay tax in the future
when they actually receive payment.
Before § 409A, deferred
compensation was barely-if at all-regulated by weak common law
and regulatory doctrines that allowed employers and employees to defer
the tax consequences of compensation nearly at will. With the passage
of § 409A in 2004, however, employers' and employees' ability to
achieve deferral was restricted. In the years to follow, there has been a
flourishing of scholarship that examines the timing and character of
income from executive compensation.6 The focus of this Article is on
the timing of income from deferred compensation (also called
nonqualified deferred compensation or executive pensions). It does not
address other elements of executive compensation such as stock
options, 7 or the "carried interests" held by investment-fund managers. 8
A simple example can be used to explain the structure of deferred
4 The classic account from the legal academy is Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise:
Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986), which analyzed several time-value
of money transactions, including deferred compensation. Professor Halperin was also the first to
call for a "special tax" on deferred compensation, a call reiterated and refined in this Article. The
classic account from economics is Myron Scholes & Merton Miller, Executive Compensation,
Taxes, and Incentives, in FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 179201 (1982).
5 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418, 1634
(2004).
6 Works focusing on§ 409A include Steven J. Arsenault & W.R. Koprowski, The Policy of
Regulating Deferral: A Critique in Light of Internal Revenue Code Section 409A, 7 Hous. Bus.
& TAX L.J. 243 (2007); Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing The Fruit of the
Tree in Its Proper Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347 (2006); Michael Doran, Time to Start Over on
Deferred Compensation, 28 VA. TAX REv. 223 (2008); William A. Drennan, Enron-Inspired
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Rules: "If You Don't Know Where You're Going, You
Might Not Get There," 73 TENN. L. REv. 415 (2006); Richard Ehrhart, Section 409A-Treasury
"Newspeak" Lost in the "Briar Patch," 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 743 (2006); Michael J. Hussey,
Has Congress Stopped Executives from Raiding the Bank? A Critical Analysis of I.R. C. § 409A,
75 UMKC L. REV. 437 (2006); Dana L. Trier, Rethinking the Taxation ofNonqualified Deferred
Compensation: Code Sec. 409A, the Hedging Regulations and Code Sec. 1032, 84 TAXES 141
(2006); Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax Benefit of Deferred Compensation, 62 TAX L.
REV. 377 (2009); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred
Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571 (2007).
7 My reluctance to address stock options comes from their vesting dynamics. The holder of
a compensatory stock option is never truly vested in the option, because she must either forfeit or
exercise the option upon termination of employment. See SIMON BENNINGA, FINANCIAL
MODELING 467 (3d ed. 2008). This Article attempts to bifurcate deferred compensation into
compensation and investment components, but bifurcating options is difficult (perhaps
impossible) because of the vesting dynamics.
8 Taxing deferred compensation is a pure timing issue, whereas carried interests involve
characterization as capital gains and interactions with the partnership tax provisions of the Code.
For background, see Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. l (2008).
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compensation and give a rough outline of tax theory to date. Suppose
that an executive and her employer are negotiating her salary for the
following year. The employer gives the executive a choice between
$100,000 of extra cash compensation paid one year later, or $200,000 of
extra cash compensation paid ten years later. It should be no surprise
that choosing the $100,000 immediate payment results in immediate
taxation to the executive. Choosing the $200,000, however, allows the
executive to defer the tax bill for ten years when actual payment occurs.
The price of the executive's tax deferral, however, is that the employer
must defer its deduction as well.9
Ideally, there would be no tax advantage or disadvantage from
deferred compensation, which would thrive or die based on its
economic usefulness. So the primary issue for tax theorists is whether
deferred compensation has any tax advantages at all. Because tax
deferral forces the employer to defer its deduction, it is difficult to tell
whether deferral is actually advantageous. One clear advantage is that
some employees can essentially engage in income averaging, deferring
current compensation into their retirement years when their marginal tax
rates might be lower. 10 Another supposed advantage is that deferred
compensation allows low-tax employers to hold investment assets as
proxies for their high-tax employees. 11
This Article attempts to build on prior work in the field to provide
a more conceptual basis for understanding the tax advantages of
deferred compensation. Toward this goal, this Article argues that
deferred compensation is best viewed as a combination of compensation
and investment components.12 An investment component must exist
because employees would not ordinarily defer current compensation
without the promise of interest or other investment potential. After
breaking down deferred compensation into separate compensation and
investment components, one can measure the adequacy of current law,
because current law already provides straightforward rules for taxing
simple compensation and investment transactions.
The established rules for taxing these simple transactions provide
the basis for the normative proposal of this Article. Differences in the
taxation of equivalent transactions create tax-planning opportunities,
which are almost always bad for society.J3 In brief, the existence of tax
advantages attracts investments, potentially crowding out superior
investments with higher pre-tax value. Indeed, tax planning itself

9 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (West 2010).
10 See infra Part II.D.
II See infra Part II.A.
12 See also Yale & Polsky, supra note 6, at 575 (referring to the "two components of deferred
compensation arrangements, the investment yield and the compensatory element").
13 David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002).
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involves the deployment of economic resources that could arguably be
put to more productive use. Moreover, because only highly
compensated employees can participate, 14 deferred compensation
benefits only well-off taxpayers, threatening the distributive policy of
the tax system.
Thus, the primary measure of current law is how well it achieves
parity with the taxation of the equivalent compensation and investment
transactions. While current law adequately taxes the compensation
component of deferred compensation, it fails to tax the investment
component at all. In essence, deferred compensation allows employers
and executives to opt out of the established system for taxing
investment transactions. Using interest on debt as an example, deferred
compensation effectively allows the employer to give tax-exempt
interest to the employee, so long as the employer is willing to forgo its
interest deduction.
Armed with this insight, this Article sets out to cure the failure of
current law and find a way to ensure neutrality between deferred
compensation and the equivalent compensation and investment
transactions. As deferred compensation can serve important nontax
goals (like managing agency costs), reform should be administrable and
cure the failures of current law without imposing any additional burdens
on deferred compensation. These constraints lead to a proposal for
imposing a "special tax" on the payment of deferred compensation.
Unlike prior proposals, the special tax proposed in this Article would be
levied only when deferred compensation is actually paid. Again, using
interest as an example, the special tax eliminates the ability of the
employer to grant tax-exempt interest to the employee. At the same
time, the employer would see its interest deduction restored.
In a prior article, this Author argued that employees should pay tax
on deferred compensation at the highest marginal rate for individuals.
The prior proposal, along with the one made in this Article, would
effectively neutralize the tax advantages of deferred compensation.
Passing these proposals would actually allow Congress to simplify the
world of deferred compensation. The recent trend of legislative action
has been to make deferral harder to achieve without altering the benefits
of deferral; once achieved, however, deferral offers the same tax
advantages that it always has. Eliminating those tax advantages would
allow Congress to repeal the burdensome and ineffective system of
regulating deferred compensation found in§ 409A of the Code.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a brief
overview of deferred compensation and a framework for analyzing it.
Deferred compensation is best viewed as a combination of debt and

14

See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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investment components, each giving rise to claims by the IRS. Part II
summarizes prior proposals for taxing deferred compensation. Part III
provides a conceptual framework for current-law taxation of deferred
compensation. While current law adequately taxes the compensation
component of deferred compensation, it does not tax the investment
component at all. Part IV proposes a "special tax" that would cure this
failure where the investment component of deferred compensation is a
simple debt transaction. Part V expands and refines this proposal,
making it applicable to a wide array of deferred compensation
arrangements. The Conclusion contains some concluding remarks, as
well as appendices containing some technical details.

I.

A

BACKGROUND ON DEFERRED COMPENSATION
AND KINDRED ITEMS

Nonqualified Deferred Compensation: Taxation
upon Actual Payment

The essence of nonqualified deferred compensation is that an
employer makes an unfunded promise to pay funds in the future in
exchange for services received currently. If properly arranged, this
unfunded promise does not result in current taxation to the employee,
even if the promise is unqualified and made by a financially solvent
employer. Is Only upon actual payment will the employee face any tax
consequences, even if the right to payment was secured by services
performed in a prior year. The lynchpin allowing the employee to avoid
taxation until actual payment is the cash-method of accounting, under
which a taxpayer generally pays tax only upon actual receipt of an item
ofincome.t6
The cash-method of accounting is subject to several conditions. It
is possible (though rare) that an employee is subject to the accrual, not
cash, method of accounting. 17 More significant limitations are the

15 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(l)(i) (as amended in 2006).
17 Cf BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES,
AND GIFTS~ 105.4 ("Nearly all individuals and most unincorporated service businesses use cash

accounting."). Under the accrual method a taxpayer has gross income when the taxpayer' s rights
to the income have been secured and can be valued with reasonable accuracy. See Treas. Reg. §
1.446-I(c)(l)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2006). Tax theorists usually regard the cash-method of
accounting as inferior to the accrual method, but this view is not unanimous. See Joseph M.
Dodge, Exploring the Income Tax Treatment of Borrowing and Liabilities, or Why the Accrual
Method Should Be Eliminated, 26 VA. TAX. REv. 245 (2006). This Article concedes that accrualmethod taxation of individuals is unlikely to occur, and instead attempts to design a "special tax"
that achieves rough parity with the accrual method.
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doctrines of economic benefit and constructive receipt. The economicbenefit doctrine will accelerate tax before actual payment if the
employer irrevocably sets aside cash or property for the benefit of the
employee. 18 An unfunded promise itself is not considered to be
property and does not trigger the economic benefit doctrine. 19
Similarly, the constructive-receipt doctrine will accelerate tax before
actual payment if the employee could have immediate and unrestricted
access to the funds.2o
Historically, satisfying the two doctrines was the main goal in
structuring deferred compensation arrangements. 21 In 2004, however,
Congress enacted § 409 A of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 which now
extensively regulates deferred compensation.23 Rather than banning
deferred compensation altogether, § 409A adds to the prior restrictions
found in the constructive-receipt and economic-benefit doctrines.2 4 In
broad terms, § 409A limits the ability of employees to elect both the
initial deferral of compensation and the ultimate payment of amounts
previously deferred. 25 The operational rules of § 409 A are quite
complex and dominate the legal concerns of employers structuring
deferred compensation plans. Fortunately, § 409A is largely irrelevant
to the analysis ofthis Article. Section 409A regulates the types of plans
that successfully defer compensation, but does nothing to alter the tax
consequences of successful deferral. Moreover, the examples used in
this Article are relatively simple deferred compensation arrangements
that are not likely to raise difficult issues under § 409A or the prior
judicial doctrines.
Successful deferral of compensation results in the employee paying
no tax when compensation is earned. Rather, tax is due only when the
compensation is actually paid. This rule of deferral applies to the
18 The economic-benefit doctrine is now largely (if not completely) codified in I.R.C. § 83
and the related regulations. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005) (imposing tax upon
the beneficiary of a "beneficial interest in assets (including money) which are transferred or set
aside from the claims of creditors of the transferor, for example, in a trust or escrow account).
19 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005).
20 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(b) (as amended in 1979).
21 Cf T. David Cowart & Greta E. Cowart, Statutory Standards for Deferral under I.R.C.
Section 409A , at§ 14.01(1), in BENDER'S FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF RETIREMENT PLANS
(Alvin Lurie ed., 2008) ("Prior to the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 ... the taxation of deferred compensation was principally governed by Section 451 . .. and
the judicial doctrines of constructive receipt and economic benefit.").
22 American Jobs Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418, 1634.
23 See I.R.C. § 409A (West 2010).
24 See I.R.S. Notice 2005-1 , 2005-1 C.B. 274 ("[Section] 409A does not alter or affect the
application of any other provision of the Code or common law tax doctrine. Accordingly,
deferred compensation not required to be included in income under§ 409A may nevertheless be
required to be included in income under § 451, the constructive receipt doctrine, the cash
equivalency doctrine, § 83, the economic benefit doctrine, the assignment of income doctrine or
any other applicable provision of the Code or common law tax doctrine.").
25 See Cowart & Cowart, supra note 21, ~ 14.01[1].

HeinOnline -- 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1672 2009-2010

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

2010]

1673

employer as well, even if it uses the accrual method of accounting. 26
Example 1: It is 2008, and Ray Corp. is negotiating compensation
with a senior executive, Emily. Ray Corp. will pay Emily a salary of
at least $1,000,000 in 2009. Also, Ray Corp. will either pay an
additional $100,000 in 2009, or promise to pay Emily $200,000 in
2019 (in lieu of the $100,000 of additional compensation). Agreeing
to the deferral, Emily is taxed on $1 ,000,000 in 2009 and $200,000
in 20 19. Ray Corp. takes corresponding deductions in the same
years.

Note that Emily does not pay tax on the full $1,100,000 in 2009,
even though there is strong evidence that this is the value of her 2009
pay package.
Although such arrangements are now extensively
regulated by § 409A, the basic tax consequences remain the same as
they have for decades. Emily has, in substance, earned an extra
$100,000 in 2009, but she pays no tax on this amount until 2019 when
she receives the original $100,000, plus an additional $100,000
representing the time value of money. Ray Corp. bears a cost from
agreeing to this deferral, as it must wait until 2019 to deduct the
compensation. 2 7
B.

The Scholes-Wolfson Model: The Three Perspectives
of Executive Compensation

The interesting question about deferred compensation is whether
deferral is valuable to taxpayers. From the perspective of the employee
alone, deferral is quite valuable, as evidenced by the popularity of
Individual Retirement Accounts, 401(k) plans, and the like. From the
perspective of the employer, however, deferral is potentially onerous.
The employer will usually need to defer any deduction on the
compensation until the time that the employee includes the
compensation in income. Thus, whether tax deferral is advantageous is
not immediately clear, as it must be examined from the perspective of
both the employer and employee.
What is needed, then, is a method to examine taxes from the joint
perspective of the parties, asking whether the tax savings to the
employee outweigh the tax detriments to the employer. The joint (or
"global" as the authors put it) perspective is the hallmark of the
"Scholes-Wolfson model," named for the two original coauthors of
Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach. 28 As the authors
26 I.R.C. § 404(a)(5).
27 !d.
28 MYRON S . SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH

(4th ed. 2009).
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say:
[W]e adopt a global planning approach [to taxes and business
strategy] .... [T]here are three aspects of planning globally:
1. Multilateral approach: All contracting parties must be taken into
account in tax planning. This is a global or multilateral, rather than
unilateral, approach.
2. Importance of hidden taxes: All taxes must be taken into account.
We are interested in a global measure of taxes, not simply explicit
taxes.
3. Importance of nontax costs: All costs of business must be
considered, not just tax cost. 29

This Article will not consider hidden taxes or nontax costs.3o
Instead, it will examine the federal-income-tax treatment of deferred
compensation from a joint perspective, including the tax treatment of
both employer and employee.
The Scholes-Wolfson model views taxes as an item to be planned
around by private parties. All else being equal, the private parties will
attempt to minimize the claim of the tax authority. The authors say:
All of the interesting problems in tax planning arise because, from
the standpoint of individual taxpaying entities, the taxing authority is
an uninvited party to all contracts. The taxing authority brings to
each of its "forced" ventures with taxpayers a set of contractual
terms (tax rules). Unlike other contracting parties, the taxing
authority generally does not negotiate these terms separately for each
venture. . . . Instead, it announces a standard set of terms taxpayers
must accept. In addition, although the taxing authority claims a
partnership interest in taxpayer profits, it exercises no voting rights.
Nor does it directly monitor taxpayer performance to determine
whether taxpayers are violating the contractual terms. Of course, the
taxing authority does conduct audits. 31

If one focuses solely on the federal income tax, deferred
compensation involves three parties: employer, employee, and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). (Of course, the IRS is itself agent for
the claims of American society at large.) The employer and employee
have every incentive to act in concert so as to minimize the IRS's share
of transactions. Unlike private parties, policymakers should not set out
to maximize what the IRS receives. Rather, they should seek to protect
the IRS's proper share of transactions. The question then becomes:
What share of transactions properly belongs to the IRS?
29

!d. at 3.

I am agnostic as to whether hidden taxes or nontax costs are important to deferred
compensation. Important work does, however, link those costs to important policy concerns.
See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, A Thermometer for the Tax System: The Overall Health of the Tax
System as Measured by Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L. REv. 13 (2003); David M. Schizer, Frictions as
a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1312 (2001).
31 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 28.
30
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The Scholes-Wolfson model simplifies policymaking by focusing
our attention on the IRS's claims to transactions rather than individual
parties. One can safely disregard any fairness concerns about the
allocation of tax burdens of the executive or the employer because the
parties are financially sophisticated and able to adjust their transaction
in response to the formal incidence of any tax. Given a certain
transaction, all that is important is that the IRS will receive its share.
For basic transactions (like cash compensation or interest payments),
the proper share of the IRS is determined by larger, societal goals
surrounding the tax system. 32 Basic transactions under the ScholesWolfson model are inherently impervious to tax planning. A contract
for cash wages, payable as services are rendered, has clear tax
consequences that are not easily avoidable.
Deferred compensation, in contrast, is a combination of wage and
investment elements. The essence of deferred compensation is that the
employer performs services today in exchange for cash in the future,
and the employee will require that amounts currently deferred be
augmented by some reasonable investment return. 33 Recall that in
Example 1 above, Emily had a choice between compensation of
$100,000 today or $200,000 in ten years.
Thus, the deferred
compensation contract gives Emily $100,000 of compensation, plus
$100,000 of investment return. In this example, the investment return is
a certain sum, closely analogous to a promissory note. Indeed, Emily's
return could be perfectly replicated by a combination of current wages
and an interest-bearing promissory note. Ray Corp. could pay current
cash wages, and Emily could then lend the wages to Ray Corp. for an
interest-bearing promissory note. Thus, there are two transactions
(deferred compensation and a wage/note combination) that produce
identical cash flows absent taxes.
Despite their economic equivalence, the two transactions are
subject to different tax treatment. Obviously, if the transaction is
structured as wages and a promissory note, the IRS will have a tax
claim to both elements. As discussed in Part III below, however, the
taxes imposed on deferred compensation are usually less than the taxes
Deferred
imposed on the equivalent wage/note combination.
compensation may be equivalent to a wage/note combination, but
current law limits the IRS's claim to the wage element only. This
Article, therefore, proposes a "special tax" on deferred compensation
that recognizes the IRS's claim to the investment element of deferred
32 See, e.g., BITIKER & LOKKEN: FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ch. 3
(discussing basics of federal tax policy). For a summary of the IRS's share of basic transactions,
see infra Part I. C.
33 An exception would exist if future tax rates were so much lower that the employee would
be willing to forgo the time-value of money.
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compensation as well, thus minimizing the tax differences between the
two equivalent transactions.
Policymakers should attempt to minimize (if not eliminate) the tax
differences between the equivalent transactions for reasons of equity
and efficiency. Negating tax planning achieves horizontal equity by
ensuring equivalent tax treatment of taxpayers who engage in equivalent
economic activities. The tax savings from deferred compensation may
not be available to self employed or retired workers. Because only
highly compensated employees can participate,3 4 deferred compensation
threatens vertical equity as well. As for efficiency concerns, the
existence of tax advantages attracts investments, potentially crowding
out superior investments with higher pre-tax value. Similarly, tax
planning itself involves the deployment of economic resources that
could arguably be put to more productive use.
The Code, of course, explicitly encourages tax planning in many
cases. The "deferred compensation" of this Article refers to plans that
do not quality for the very significant tax benefits of § 401(a) and
similar provisions. Plans that do quality (such as 401(k) plans, ESOPs,
and defined benefit pensions)35 are advantaged over deferred
compensation36 in at least two ways.
First, the employer can
irrevocably set aside funds for the employee, free from the claims of the
employer's creditors, without triggering current taxation to the
employee and without subjecting the funds to any income tax. 37
Second, the employer can deduct the expense of qualified retirement
plans before the employee pays tax on the benefits. Even with the
limits of§ 409A, however, deferred compensation is more flexible than
qualified retirement plans, which have limits on the amounts of
benefits38 and restrictions on the amounts that can be offered to highly
compensated employees.39
In contrast to the advantages Congress grants to 401 (k) plans and
the like, any tax advantages for nonqualified deferred compensation are
unintentional. Deferred compensation is extended primarily to highly
compensated employees, and there is no reason that either they or their
employers should receive a tax break from the deferral. At the same
time, deferred compensation may well have non-tax benefits, such as
the control of agency costs. Just as there is no reason to encourage
these arrangements, there is no reason for Congress to impose punitive
taxes on them either. The premise of this Article is that policymakers
34 See infra note 128 and accompanying
35 I.R.C. § 40I(a) (West 2010).

text.

36 As used in tills Article, deferred compensation is synonymous with nonqua1ified deferred
compensation.
37 See Chason, supra note 6, at 361-62.
38 See I.R.C. § 415 (West 2010).
39 See id. §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b).
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should strive to tax deferred compensation in the same manner that they
tax an equivalent transaction composed of simple cash wages and an
investment contract.

C.

Taxation of "Basic" Compensation and Investment Transactions
1.

Introduction

As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to break up deferred
compensation transactions into separate compensation and debt
components. Once the transactions are so divided, it becomes possible
to apply the ordinary tax rules applicable to compensation and interest
to those separate transactions, and then to compare those results with
the results that current law provides for deferred compensation.
Readers should be aware that the focus on debt is a simplifying
assumption. The investment component of deferred compensation can
also be based on a myriad of investment returns, such as employer
stock. Such non-debt deferred compensation arrangements are like
forward contracts, which are derivatives that roughly replicate the
returns on owning an asset. 40 Ultimately, this Article will argue that
every deferred compensation plan can be thought of as a combination of
current compensation, debt, and forward-contract elements. 41
Part I.C provides a very brief overview of the taxation of
compensation, debt, and forward-contract transactions. In addition, Part
I.C describes the net economic claim that the IRS has from these
transactions. This Article focuses on the net claim of the IRS because
compensation and debt transactions involve two taxpayers, who--in the
context of deferred compensation-are both financially sophisticated
and well-off. Therefore, there should be no equitable concerns about
assigning tax liability to one or the other. Moreover, the parties can
quite easily shift the nominal tax burden between them contractually.
The controlling tax rules are thus irrelevant, so long as the net claim of
the IRS is the same. In short, what matters is what the IRS receives, not
the identity of the taxpayers.
To illustrate the methodology, this Article views wages, debt, and
forward contracts as private-party transactions giving rise to claims by
the IRS. An executive might give up to 35% of her wages to the federal
government, along with 35% of her interest income. This claim of the
government is not, however, a net winner in every situation. For every
40 Cf ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 19 (6th ed. 2005) (describing "forward-type
contracts" as "'price fixing' agreements that saddle the buyer with the same price risks as actually
owning the asset").
41 See infra Part V.B.
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employee there is an employer, for every lender a borrower. These
counterparties often (but not always) deduct the wages and interest on
which the employees and lenders pay tax. Thus, if an employer and
employee are both paying tax at 35%, the payment of wages leads to no
income tax to the government.
A brief word is in order on how to determine the net claim. The
net value of the IRS's claim to compensation and debt transactions turns
on the "marginal tax rate" faced by parties to the transaction. As used
in this Article, the term marginal tax rate is an economic, not statutory,
concept, referring to the present value of income taxes (current or
future) to be paid on one dollar of additional taxable income. 42 The
marginal tax rate is not the average (or so-called effective) tax rate.
Effective tax rates are relevant in determining whether certain taxpayers
are paying too much or too little in taxes, but they are not relevant to
determining the incremental taxes paid or saved from discrete
transactions.
Because deferred compensation is almost always granted to highlycompensated employees,43 this Article assumes that the marginal tax
rate of employees is the top statutory rate (currently 35%). 44
Admittedly, this is crude and over-inclusive, but only somewhat.
Federal pension law bars employers from offering deferred
compensation to rank-and-file employees.45 Regrettably, the
Department of Labor has never specified a compensation level that
triggers eligibility for deferred compensation,46 but $245,000 is
probably a de facto safe harbor. 47 Everyone at that level of income is in
the 33% bracket, at least.48 So the assumption does lead to some error,
though to a tolerable degree.
Turning to the employer, this Article will assume that the employer
is a publicly traded corporation. Like individuals, corporations pay a
42 Cf MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING
APPROACH 204 (4th ed. 2009) ("We defme the marginal tax rate as the present value of current
plus deferred income taxes ... to be paid per dollar of additional (or marginal) taxable income.").
43 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
44 See I.R.C. § l(a)-(e), (i)(2). Of course, high-income taxpayers may see their marginal tax
rates fall in retirement as they earn less income. In this Article, I will generally assume that
marginal tax rates remain static over time.
45 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
46 See MICHAELS. SIRKIN & LAWRENCE K. CAGNEY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION§ 7.03[2]
("The question of what constitutes a 'select group of management or highly compensated
employees' has not been the subject of any definitive construction by the Department of Labor,
which is the government agency with authority to administer Title I of ERISA, nor in court
decisions.").
47 Deferred compensation plans often grant benefits that carmot be granted by qualified
retirement plans once the employee earns more than the pay limit imposed by I.R.C. § 401(a)(l7).
See id. § 7.04[1]. For 2009, the pay limit is $245,000. See IRS Armounces Pension Plan
Limitations for 2009, I.R.S. News Release IR-2008-118 (Oct. 16, 2008).
48 See Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 § 3.01.
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maximum statutory rate of 35%,49 but there is good evidence that many
publicly traded corporations face marginal tax rates lower than 35%.50
Unlike executives, corporations are not amenable to a universal
assumption about their tax rates. Recall that the marginal tax rate, as an
economic matter, is the present value of income taxes (current or future)
to be paid on one dollar of additional taxable income. 51 A firm with a
current loss might have no additional current taxes paid from an extra
dollar ofincome, 52 yet an additional dollar of income will reduce the net
operating losses (NOLs) that it accumulates. These NOLs can be
carried forward to future years to reduce future tax liabilities. 53 Once
the firm becomes profitable, the NOLs can be "cashed in" against
statutory taxes. So an additional dollar of income for a firm operating at
a loss does result in additionalfuture taxes that the firm must pay. If the
statutory rate is 35%, the firm will face an additional tax of 35¢ at some
point in the future. Of course, this 35¢ must be discounted to present
value, and there is considerable difficulty of forecasting exactly when
this future tax will be paid. 54
Financial economists have estimated the marginal tax rates that
actual corporations face, ranging from 0% to 35% (the main statutory
rate for corporations). 55 If the corporation pays tax at the employee's
rate (assumed to be 35%), then the IRS has no net claim to the
investment component of deferred compensation. Deferred
compensation becomes interesting only if the rate is lower than the
employee's rate (assumed to be 35%). For purposes of illustration, this
Article will frequently use a 20% marginal tax rate for its examples,
though the ultimate proposal of this Article will tum on the employer's
marginal tax rate at the time of payment. 56

49 I.R.C. § ll(b)(l)(D).
50 The possible reasons for the disparity include net operating losses, leverage, and tax
shelters. See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 42, at 204-10; Johnson, supra note 30 (arguing that
relatively high returns on municipal bonds implies low economic tax rates).
51 See supra text accompanying note 42.
52 Net operating losses can be carried back two years and forward twenty years. See I.R.C. §
172(b)(l). If the firm can carry the NOLs back to a prior year, they can be cashed in
immediately. For such a firm, the marginal tax rate is the statutory rate. See SCHOLES ET AL. ,
supra note 28, at 205.
53 See LR.C. §I72(b)(l).
54 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 28, at 205-06.
55 See John R. Graham et al., Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy, 59
J. FIN. 1585, 1603 (2004).
56 See infra text accompanying note 132.
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IRS's Compensation Claim

Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code expressly taxes
"[ c]ompensation for services" as gross income, 57 thus subjecting the
recipient of cash compensation to taxation. 58 The broad principle of
inclusion to the employee has a counterpart: Compensation expenses are
generally deductible by employers. Under § 162(a), an employer may
deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including-{ I) a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered." 59 The employers that are likely to offer
deferred compensation usually face few obstacles in deducting
compensation expenses. Accordingly, this Article generally assumes
the payment of compensation is fully deductible under§ 162(a).
Section 162(m) does, however, limit the deduction by a publicly
held corporation on amounts paid to its CEO and three other highest
paid officers, 60 as the corporation can deduct only $1 ,000,000 of annual
salary paid to each of these four officers.6 1 A significant attraction of
deferred compensation is avoiding the § 162(m) limit. A $10,000,000
salary for a public-corporation CEO is not deductible if paid currently.
Yet the corporation and CEO might agree to defer $9,000,000 of the
salary to the year after the CEO retires. At the time of payout, the CEO
would be a former CEO and no longer subject to the limits of §
l62(m).6 2 The CEO could be made whole with time-value-of-money
adjustments, and the corporation could take a full deduction for the
post-retirement payout.
In conceptualizing the IRS's net claim to compensation, this
Article ignores the § 162(m) limit. Accounting for the § 162(m) limit
57 I.R.C. § 6l(a).
58 The receipt of vested property and like-kind benefits also subjects the recipient to tax.
l.R.C. § 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-l(a) (as
amended in 2003). Similarly, courts have held that an employer's payment of an employee's
obligations (for example, the employee's tax liability) is itself gross income. See, e.g., Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
59 I.R.C. § 162(a).
60 The Code itself limits deductions for the "covered employees," defined to be the CEO and
the four most highly compensated officers whose compensation must be reported under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78. I.R.C. § 162(m)(3). In 2006, however, the
SEC amended its disclosure rules to cover the CEO, CFO, and the three most highly compensated
officers. In response to the SEC change, the IRS issued a notice stating that it would treat only
the CEO and the three most highly compensated employees as covered employees. I.R.S. Notice
2007-49,2007-1 C.B. 1429 (June 18, 2007).
61 I.R.C. § 162(m).
62 But see I.R.C. § 162(m)(5}(A)(ii) (disallowing deductions for deferred compensation over
$500,000 for top executives of firms participating in TARP).
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would unduly complicate the "special tax" ultimately proposed by this
Article. Moreover, since § 162(m) arguably implements non-tax
policies of improving corporate governance, rather than the tax policy
of ensuring the IRS's claim to compensation transactions, 63 its reach is
beyond the main concerns of this Article.
By assuming fully deductible compensation, it is possible to focus
on the amount of the IRS's net claim to compensation transactions,
which will turn on the difference in marginal tax rates faced by
employer and employee. If the employer and employee face the same
marginal tax rate, then the IRS has no claim to the compensation. If,
however, the employer faces a lower tax rate, the IRS has a positive net
claim. Consider the following examples:
Example 2: Emily is employed by Ray Corp. at an annual salary of
$1,100,000. Both Emily and Ray Corp. face a 35% marginal tax
rate. Emily must pay tax in the amount of $350,000, but Ray Corp.
gets a deduction worth $350,000. Thus, the IRS has no net claim to
the compensation.
Example 3: Same as Example 2, except that Emily faces a 35%
marginal tax rate and Ray Corp. only 20%. As before, Emily pays
tax in the amount of $350,000. But Ray Corp. now has a deduction
worth only $200,000. Thus, the IRS has a net claim to the
compensation in the amount of$150,000.

Generalizing from these examples, the net claim of the IRS turns
on the amount of compensation and the difference in tax rates between
the parties. In Example 2, the tax rates were equal, and the IRS had no
net claim. In Example 3, the compensation was $1,000,000, and the
difference in rates was 15% (35%- 20%); thus, the IRS's net claim was
$150,000.
The IRS would have a net liability from compensation if the
employee has a lower tax rate than the employer. This Article, dealing
with the compensation of executives, makes the conservative
assumption that paying compensation is either revenue-neutral or
revenue-producing. Executives will typically be at the highest marginal
tax rate of 35%, which is also the highest corporate tax rate. If both
employer and employee are at the 35% rate, then compensation is
revenue neutral. The corporation may, however, be at a lower marginal
tax rate than its executives because it is not very profitable, or because it
has net operating losses that absorb current income.64

63 Examples of the corporate governance scholarship surrounding § 162(m) are given supra
note 3.
64 See supra note 42.
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IRS's Interest Claim

Simple deferred compensation plans can be analogized to a formal
loan between the employer (as borrower) and employee (as lender).
This Part briefly examines the taxation of interest, assuming a highincome, individual creditor and a corporate borrower. Interest paid or
received on indebtedness follows a pattern similar to that of salary and
other compensation-it is generally deductible by the borrower65 and
taxable to the creditor.66 Like compensation income, interest income is
taxed to individuals at a maximum 35% tax rate, and this Article
generally assumes that the individual is subject to the 35% rate for all
periods. As for the corporate borrower, the value of its interest
deduction will depend on its marginal tax rate, which may be 35% or
lower. As a result, the IRS's net claim to a debt transaction is like its
claim to a simple compensation transaction. Recall that with a
compensation transaction, the IRS has a net claim based on the amount
of compensation multiplied by the difference in tax rates between
employer and employee.
Similarly, the IRS's claim to a debt
transaction is based on the amount of annual interest multiplied by the
difference in rates between the debtor and creditor.
Example 4: Emily loans $200,000 to Ray Corp. for five years at 5%
(or $1 0,000) annual interest. Both Emily and Ray Corp. face a 35%
marginal tax rate. Emily must pay tax in the amount of $3500, but
Ray Corp. gets a deduction worth $3500. Thus, the IRS has no net
claim to the interest payments.
Example 5: Same as Example 4, except that Emily faces a 35%
marginal tax rate and Ray Corp. only 20%. As before, Emily pays
tax in the amount of $3500. But Ray Corp. now has a deduction
worth $2000. Thus, the IRS has a net claim to the compensation in
the amount of$1500.
As with compensation transactions, the IRS's net claim is based on
the difference in marginal tax rates. When the tax rates are the same,
the IRS has no net claim. When the creditor's rate is higher than the
debtor's, then the net claim is equal to the amount of interest multiplied
by the difference in marginal tax rates.
Even if cash interest payments do not actually change hands,
borrowers and lenders usually recognize imputed interest every year
under the original issue discount (OlD) rules.6 7 The most basic form of
OlD is derived from zero coupon bonds.
Example 6: Emily loans $200,000 to Ray Corp. for five years. No
I.R.C. § 163(a).
I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
67 I.R.C. §§ 1272(a)(l), 163(e)(l).
65
66
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interest is due until the end of five years, at which time Ray Corp.
will repay Emily $200,000, plus accumulated interest of $50,000.
The marginal tax rates of Emily and Ray Corp. are 35% and 20%,
respectively. Because of the OlD rules, Emily and Ray Corp. must
recognize interest (income and expense) of about $10,000 every year
over the five years of the loan. 68 The IRS will receive its net claim
of about $1500 every year.

Regardless of the operation of the OlD rules, the IRS will have a
net claim of $7500 to the interest on the debt, based on 15% of the
$50,000 interest that passes from Ray Corp. to Emily. The OlD rules
simply coordinate the timing of the net claim, in effect placing both
Emily and Ray Corp. on the accrual method of accounting for interest.
Without this coordination, Emily (otherwise on the cash method) would
have waited until the final payment before being taxed on $50,000
interest. Yet Ray Corp. would have received the benefit of deductions
over the course of the loan. Thus, the IRS would face the liability of
Ray Corp.'s interest deductions before it could tax Emily's
corresponding interest income. The OlD rules prevent this temporal
mismatch, forcing both Emily and Ray Corp. to recognize annual
interest.
4.

IRS's Forward-Contract Claim

Some types of deferred compensation provide investment returns
based on the performance of employer equity or other non-debt
investments.69 Because the employee does not actually own the
employer equity or other investment, the employee essentially holds a
derivative. As explained below, 70 the relevant derivative is aforward
contract, which is a "contract that obligates the holder to buy or sell an
asset for a predetermined delivery price at a predetermined future
time." 71 The forward price is the "delivery price in a forward contract
that causes the contract to be worth zero."72 The following example
illustrates a forward contract:
Example 7: In 2009, Emily and Ray Corp. enter into a forward
contract under which Emily agrees to buy 10,000 shares of Ray
Corp. stock in 2019. Emily agrees to a delivery price of $2,000,000.
The current value of Ray Corp. stock is $100 per share, and the
prevailing interest rate is 7.2%, compounded annually. The forward
68 The annual interest would not be exactly $10,000 per year.
calculating OlD can be found at Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-l(b)(l) (1996).
69 See supra Part V.B.
70 See id.

Precise methodology for

71 JOHN C . HULL, OPTIONS, FuTuRES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 781 (7th ed. 2009).
72

/d.
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price of I 0,000 Ray Corp. shares, deliverable in ten years, is
$2,000,000. 73 Since the delivery price is the forward price, Emily
pays nothing to enter into the contract.

Since Ray Corp. is dealing in its own stock, it is functionally taxexempt with respect to its gain or loss under the contract.74 The IRS's
net claim will tum completely on Emily's tax consequences. To
simplify matters, assume that Emily and Ray Corp. agree that they will
settle the contract in cash in 2019, meaning Emily will not actually buy
Ray Corp. stock. So if the stock is worth less than $2,000,000 in 2019,
Emily will pay the difference in cash; if it is worth more, Ray Corp. will
do so. Because the contract is cash-settled, Emily will be forced to
recognize all gain or loss for tax purposes in 2019.
The forward contract will be a capital asset in Emily's hands,
producing long-term capital gain or loss.7 5 Emily's gain would be taxed
at the 15% rate,7 6 but it is difficult to generalize about the value of
Emily' s losses because taxpayers are limited in their use of capital
losses.7 7 This Article assumes, however, that any losses Emily incurs
produce a deduction worth 15% of the loss. Though this is an
assumption made in order to facilitate a clean analysis, it is not
unreasonable, because long-term capital losses can always be used to
offset long-term capital gains. 78
Under this assumption, the IRS essentially owns 15% of Emily's
forward contract. It enjoys 15% of any gain and is responsible for 15%
of any loss. From an ex ante perspective in 2009, this 15% share is
arguably worth nothing. After all, Emily paid nothing to enter into the
contract, and 15% of nothing is nothing. In 2019, of course, the IRS
may actually gain or lose depending on the performance of Ray Corp.
In 2009, however, the IRS has nothing of inherent value.79
As explained below, ignoring the IRS's claim to the forwardcontract element of deferred compensation greatly simplifies the
normative proposals of this Article. Based on the foregoing analysis,
doing so does not prejudice the IRS, because its forward-contract claim
is not inherently valuable. Admittedly, this conclusion is based on the
73 The current (spot) price of 10,000 shares is $1,100,000. The forward price for a nondividend-paying stock is the future value of the spot price. See id. In our case, that future value
$1,000,000 X 1.072 10 = $2,000,000.
74 See I.R.C. § 1032 (West 2010).
75 The fact that the contract is cash-settled should not negate its status as a capital asset. See
DAVID H. SHAPIRO, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 188-1ST: TAXATION OF EQUITY
DERIVATIVES, at Il.B.3.a ("Cash-settlement payments should also be capital gain and loss to the
respective recipient and payor.").
76 See I.R.C. § II (b)( 1)(A).
77 See l.R.C. § 12ll(b).
78 See id.
79 This account is consistent with the "Domar-Musgrave" theory, which holds that taxpayers
can avoid taxes levied on risky assets. See infra Part II. C.
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assumption that taxpayers can fully use their capital losses against
capital gains and that the IRS's 15% claim should be valued in the same
manner as a single investor's. Because of these limitations, this Article
does not argue that the IRS should be out of the business of taxing
forward contracts per se. Rather, it argues that ignoring the forwardcontract element of deferred compensation contracts is an acceptable
compromise, made to further the development of a normative proposal
that will ensure that the IRS receives its claim to the investment income
inherent in deferred compensation.
II.

PRIOR PROPOSALS REGARDING THE TAXATION
OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION

A

Annually Tax Investment Income Associated
with Deferred Compensation

Some scholars have likened deferred compensation to an
investment conduit by which the employee can essentially have her
investment income taxed at the employer's tax rate.so This Article
refers to this view as the "conduit theory" of deferred compensation.
The employer acts as something of a conduit when it sets funds aside in
a "rabbi trust"-namely, a trust securing payment of deferred
compensation benefits. The rabbi trust avoids the economic benefit
doctrine by subjecting the assets to the claims of the employer's general
creditors in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency. Because the
employer retains a benefit from the potential payment of its general
creditors, the trust is a "grantor trust" and disregarded for federal
income tax purposes.si
Example 8: In 2008, Emma, a corporate executive, and her
employer, Rex Corp., are negotiating Emma's 2009 compensation.
Emma and Rex Corp. agree that Emma will defer $100,000 of her
2009 compensation, and Rex Corp. will set those funds aside in a
rabbi trust for Emma's benefit. Rex Corp. is a functionally taxexempt U.S. corporation, whereas Emma pays tax at the 35%
bracket. Rex Corp. agrees to invest the assets of the rabbi trust in
taxable bonds that pay annual, pre-tax interest of 7.2%. At the end
of ten years, Rex Corp. pays Emily the balance of the trust, which
has grown to $200,000.8 2 In 2019, Rex Corp. pays $200,000 to
80 See Polsky & Yale, supra note 6, at 607 ("The standard for neutrality is what would have
occurred had the employee been paid cash and invested for her own account outside of the
deferred compensation context.").
81 See Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation
Plans, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487, 524-25 (2002).
10
82 $)00,000 X 1.072 = $200,000.
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Emma, who keeps $130,000 after paying tax of 35%.

This example can be contrasted with what would happen if Emma
took current compensation and invested in the bonds directly. Emma
would pay tax of 35% tax in 2009 and have $65,000 of cash to invest in
the bonds. Unlike tax-exempt Rex Corp., which enjoys a 7.2% rate of
return after-tax, Emma's return is reduced by 35% down to 4.68%.
After ten years of direct investing, Emma's $65,000 would grow to
about $103,000.83 Thus, deferred compensation gives Emma about
$27,000 more in 2019.
Essentially, the rabbi trust allows Emma to piggyback on Rex
Corp.'s tax-exempt status while investing. Because of their different
tax rates, Rex Corp. can earn 7.2% from the bonds, but Emma only
4.68%. The rabbi trust allows Emma to invest at Rex Corp.'s after-tax
return of7.2%.84 Deferral has nothing to do with the tax benefit.
The conduit theory has led scholars to call for a special tax to be
levied on the investment income associated with deferred
compensation. 85 These scholars do not advocate abandoning deferral
altogether, but rather taxing the investment component of deferred
compensation on an annual basis. The purpose of such a tax would be
to replicate the claim the IRS would have if the rabbi trust assets were
taxable to the employee rather than the employer. However, these
proposals are at tension with the economic benefit doctrine and the
regulations under § 83.86 The doctrinal counterargument is that rabbi
trust assets must be subject to the claims of the employer's creditors,
and that these claims prevent the employee from being taxed on the
rabbi trust assets. 87 This counterargument is not merely a doctrinal
impediment to reform, as benefiting from a rabbi trust is substantively
different from outright ownership of the trust assets because the
employee faces the risk of employer insolvency. 88 Instead, the
employee is a creditor of the employer, rather than the owner of assets.
Moreover, not all deferred compensation is funded by rabbi trusts,
and unfunded deferred compensation presents a serious challenge to the
10

83 $65,000 X 1.0468 = $103,000.
84 To confirm, suppose that Emma received $100,000 in 2009, paid her taxes of $35,000, and

invested the remaining $65,000 in bonds that paid 7.2% after-tax. In ten years, her money would
double, see infra note 112, and she would have $130,000. This is the same payoff that she
received from the rabbi trust.
85 See Yale & Polsky, supra note 6.
86 See I.R.C. § 83.
87 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005).
88 Moreover, the rabbi-trust structure requires that the employee remain illiquid and unable to
convert trust assets into consumption at will. Indeed, § 409A codifies employee illiquidity by
restricting the ability of employees to withdraw funds from deferred compensation plans.
Liquidity is not a necessary condition for taxing property transfers under section 83, which
imposes tax when the property is either transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. See I.R.C. § 83(a)(l) (West 2010).
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conduit theory. Professors Yale and Polsky respond by advocating a
marked-to-market tax on deferred compensation. 89 The problem with
this approach is that it would force employers to value deferred
compensation before actual payout, even though deferred compensation
often has an ambiguous value. Once employers are forced to derive a
value for deferred compensation, the logical next step is to abandon
deferral altogether.9° Professor Halperin avoids the valuation problem
through a proposal to mandate the use of rabbi trusts.9 1 Such a mandate
would effectively force employers to fund deferred compensation just as
they are required to fund qualified retirement plans.n Mandated
funding intrudes upon the contractual relationship between employer
and employee, however, and serves no apparent non-tax goal beyond
creating a pool of assets that may be taxed.
Ultimately, this Article proceeds without concerning itself with
rabbi-trust funding. If rabbi-trust funding were relevant, the appropriate
response would be to broaden § 83 and the economic-benefit doctrine in
order to reach it, essentially leading to accrual accounting for deferred
compensation.93 The approach of this Article, however, is to suggest
minimal changes to current law that would eliminate the tax advantage
of deferred compensation. First, though, it is necessary to clarify what
the tax advantage really is, and the conduit theory points in the right
direction. There is a tax advantage to deferred compensation that exists
when extended from a low-tax employer to a high-tax employee. That
advantage should not be measured by reference to rabbi-trust funding,
whether real or hypothetical, but rather by reference to the contract that
exists between the employer and the employee.
B.

Place Executives on the Accrual Method ofAccounting

The most direct way to eliminate the tax advantages of deferral is
to eliminate deferral altogether by placing executive-level employees on
the accrual method of accounting. This approach contrasts with current
law, which allows deferral for a select class of arrangements. Professor
Michael Doran writes:
Accrual-based taxation, which follows directly from the HaigSimons definition of income, presents the correct result as a matter
of tax policy. That approach treats deferred compensationregardless of whether it is "good" or "bad" (in the sense of satisfying

89 See Yale & Polsky, supra note 6, at 610.
90 See infra Part II.B.

See Halperin, supra note 4, at 549.
Cf I.R.C. §§ 430-432 (establishing funding requirements for defmed benefit plans).
93 See infra Part II.B.

91

92
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or not satisfying an arbitrary set of statutory requirements)-just like
current compensation. In other words, accrual-based taxation
eliminates the possibility of a tax preference for deferred
compensation. 94

Presumably, certain technical details would have to be dealt with,
like the treatment of investment earnings and the exact timing of
income-inclusion when the employee is not vested.
Thirty years ago, Congress quashed an IRS attempt to tax deferred
compensation plans that were elective on the part of the employee. 95
Political sentiment is different today, and Congress made nascent moves
toward accrual accounting for deferred compensation with the passage
of I.R.C. § 457 A in 2008.96 Section 457 A applies to a very limited class
of deferred compensation plans, namely those offered by foreign
corporations and partnerships with tax-exempt investors. Still, the
existence of the statute shows some willingness on the part of Congress
to put deferred compensation on the accrual method.
There are, however, objections to accrual accounting. The accrual
method of accounting, as set forth in Treasury regulations, imposes tax
"when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such
income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable
accuracy."9 7 The first prong-fixed right to receive-is not a serious
problem. The second prong-amount determined with reasonable
accuracy-is a problem. The ultimate amount of payment under a
deferred compensation plan might tum on several contingencies, like
investment performance and employee mortality. Dealing with these
contingencies is possible,98 but policymakers should be aware that
94 Doran, supra note 6, at 226; see also Michael Doran, Executive Compensation Reform and
the Limits of Tax Policy (Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311113.
95 Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638, 4639 (Feb. 3, 1978) (proposing
regulations that would immediately tax compensation deferred at an employee's election), with
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2782 (negating the proposed
regulations by mandating that deferred compensation be taxed according to "the principles set
forth in regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions relating to deferred compensation which were
in effect on February 1, 1978").
96 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 801, 122 Stat.
3765, 3929-31 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 457A (West 2010)).
97 Treas. Reg.§ 1.451-l(a)(as amended in 1999).
98 Congress used a sledgehammer to deal with these contingencies in § 457 A. Employees
subject to § 457A can defer tax when the amount of compensation is "not determinable," but
must augment the ultimate tax owed with interest and a 20% additional tax. I.R.C. § 457A(c)
(West 2010). Their approach to the Social Security and Medicare (i.e., FICA) taxes is somewhat
more nuanced. FICA generally applies to deferred compensation at the time it is earned. See
Treas. Reg.§ 31.312l(v)(2)-l(e)(l) (1999). However, tax is deferred if the amount deferred is
not "reasonably ascertainable." See Treas. Reg.§ 31.312l(v)(2)-l(e)(4)(i). FICA applies only to
the compensation (i.e., wage) component of deferred compensation. It does not apply to
investment earnings on the amounts initially deferred. In this sense, early taxation is a good thing
under FICA. The problem with extending the FICA approach to the income tax is that deferral
for the income tax is typically desired by employers and employees, who would have an incentive
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accrual method of accounting needs adjustment to handle long-term,
contingent promises like deferred compensation.99
There are other obstacles to accrual accounting as well. None are
thoroughly persuasive, but they might still be raised in political
discourse. Since payment of deferred compensation is contingent upon
the solvency of the employer, employees might pay tax on amounts they
never actually receive. 100 More significantly, employees receiving large
awards of deferred compensation might face significant liquidity
constraints. Some might fear that accrual accounting would give
employers an excuse to pay excessive executive compensation in the
form of "gross ups" to cover the accelerated tax bills. Finally, accrual
taxation would lead to even more compensation being rendered
nondeductible under limits found in§ 162(m) of the Code.
Accrual taxation may well be ideal, and the difficulties listed above
may well be surmountable. A thorough proposal on subjecting deferred
compensation to accrual taxation is a worthwhile and timely task,
especially in light of congressional efforts to subject limited forms of
deferred compensation to accrual taxation. Nevertheless, this is a route
not taken by this Article, which instead takes the incremental path of
proposing a system of taxing deferred compensation that replicates the
results of accrual taxation without triggering the practical difficulties of
immediate taxation.
C.

Do Nothing

In an apparent about face from a prior article, Professor Ethan Yale
recently argued that the tax advantage of deferred compensation is
relatively meager and that further legal reform might not be justified. 10 1
Professor Yale's arguments are based on the "Domar-Musgrave
theory," which essentially bifurcates investment returns into risk-free
and risky elements. 102 Under the right assumptions, taxpayers can avoid
to structure deferred compensation in a manner that makes the amount deferred not "reasonably
ascertainable."
99 Employers currently deduct deferred compensation on a cash basis, even if they otherwise
follow the accrual method of accounting. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5).
100 See Halperin, supra note 4, at 541-42. Of course, employer stock can also be considered
"phantom income" that dissipates upon employer insolvency. In addition to the phantom-income
problem, Professor Halperin is also concerned about the "income bunching" that would result
from accrual method taxation. This Article's view is that income bunching is part and parcel of a
progressive tax system that has no formal system for income averaging. Thus, in my prior article,
I advocated taxing all deferred compensation payments at the highest marginal rate.
101 See Yale, supra note 6.
102 Cf David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX. L. REV. I, 1-2 (2004)
("Income tax, the [Domar-Musgrave]literature argues, do not tax most returns to capital. ... The
reason is that capital income is mostly a return to bearing risk, and individuals, even in a Haig-
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taxation of the risky element of all returns to capital. Taxpayers cannot,
however, avoid the taxation of the risk-free element. This element,
though, is relatively meager according to the Domar-Musgrave
adherents, especially when one excludes the inflation of the nominal
interest. Under Domar-Musgrave, then, deferred compensation merely
allows employees and employers to avoid the tax on this meager riskfree element, which is not worth protecting according to Professor Yale.
Deferred compensation presents problems, however, for the
Domar-Musgrave theory. The theory holds that taxpayers can avoid the
taxation of risky returns by increasing their exposure to risk, a point
illustrated by Professor David Weisbach with a simple wager on a coin
flip. 103 Heads, the taxpayer wins $1 00; tails, the taxpayer loses $100. If
the IRS imposes a 50% tax on wagers (allowing the taxpayer to deduct
any losses), then the initial bet becomes $50 winnings for a heads and
$50 losses for tails. Clearly, though, the taxpayer can avoid the impact
of this tax by simply doubling her bet. In the end, the taxpayer achieves
the $100 gain or loss, regardless of taxes.
However, introducing counterparties complicates this analysis
considerably. The taxpayer is gambling with someone who presumably
has some tax consequences. Now, if the counterparty also faces a 50%
tax rate, then taxes are truly meaningless as they produce no net revenue
for the government. The gamble is a zero-sum game, and the tax from
one side's winnings will be offset by the deduction from the other side's
losses. If the counterparty faces a different rate, however, then the
parties cannot adjust the gambling contract so that both of them avoid
the effect of taxes. As an extreme example, suppose that one party pays
tax of 50%, and the other is tax exempt. The 50% taxpayer will want to
double her bet to adjust for taxes, but the tax-exempt party has no
reason to adjust at all. In a fluid market, of course, gamblers can just
find someone willing to gamble on coin tosses at the desired level.
But employment relationships are not so fluid. An executive taxed
at 50% may want to double her deferred compensation to avoid taxes,
but a functionally tax-exempt employer will want to make no
adjustment at all. The executive will be unlikely to abandon the firmspecific human and financial capital she has accumulated just to find an
employer that will make the proper adjustments. And because
nonqualified deferred compensation is long-term with idiosyncratic
terms (like non-compete agreements), the employee cannot turn to
derivatives markets to adjust for the taxation of capital income.
Moreover, the Domar-Musgrave result may not be strong enough
to warrant abandoning the taxation of capital income from deferred
compensation if the current income taxation of capital returns is
Simons system, can and will, eliminate the tax on this type of return.").
103 See id. at 8-11.
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otherwise maintained.
The Domar-Musgrave literature typically
excludes inflation gains from taxation because they are not economic
income, even though they clearly constitute taxable income under
current law.I04 Once inflation gains are taxed as they are under current
law, then the risk-free looks far more substantial. By one reckoning, the
risk-free rate after inflation was a mere 0.5% from 1929 to 1989, but
inflation was 3 .1 %. 1os
There is also an issue about the way in which the risk-free rate is
taxed. Professor Yale views deferred compensation as being akin to a
capital asset, taxed only upon realization. In contrast, this Article views
deferred compensation as essentially a debt contract that should give
rise to annual tax consequences at ordinary rates. This different
methodology makes a significant difference in valuing the tax benefit
that Professor Yale dismisses as being meager. For example, using an
illustration from Professor Yale's article, the tax benefit of $100 of
compensation deferred over ten years is $3.60 according to Professor
Yale's method. 106 Using the same assumptions as Professor Yale but
changing only the methodology, this Article's approach would value the
tax benefit at $9.10.107
This Author is sympathetic to many of Professor Yale's concerns,
particularly his criticism of the complexity of recent reform efforts, like
§ 409A. 108 Reform can, however, result in simplification. By
eliminating the tax benefit of deferred compensation, Congress could
also eliminate the burdensome regulatory regime found in § 409 A of the
Code and allow deferred compensation to be regulated by the historical
doctrines of constructive receipt and economic benefit.
D.

Tax Payments at the Highest Marginal Tax Rate

In a prior article, this Author argued that Congress should tax
deferred compensation at the highest marginal rates for individuals.
The rationale for this proposal was that deferred compensation gives
executives an inappropriate method by which to engage in income
Seeid. at31.
See id. (discussing Joseph A. Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an
Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REv. 377,
387-88 (1992)).
106 See Yale, supra note 6, at 26 (describing the risk-adjusted tax benefit for ten years of
deferral as 0.036).
107 Professor Yale assumes an interest rate of 4%, an employee-level tax of 35%, and a
corporate-level tax of 0%. See id. This Article assumes that the interest rate is before tax,
implying an after-tax rate of 2.6%. The present value of the special tax proposed in this Article,
levied on an initial deferral of$100, would be 2.6% x 10 x (35%- 0%) x $100 = $9.10.
108 Cf Yale, supra note 6, at 27 (noting "the staggering complexity of recent legislative forays
into this domain (most significantly recently enacted IRC § 409A)").
104
lOS
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averaging. An executive earning compensation in a high tax bracket
(say 35%) might expect to face a lower bracket (say 28%) in retirement,
and deferred compensation allows the executive to have the lower
bracket apply to compensation earned in higher-bracket years.
Allowing ad hoc income averaging to corporate executives is
inconsistent with vertical equity (because lower paid workers typically
cannot participate in deferred compensation) and with horizontal equity
(because the ability to defer compensation depends on the existence and
willingness of the employer to accommodate the employee's tax
planning). Finally, it is inefficient because deferred compensation may
crowd out other investments and draw resources into socially
unproductive tax planning. In short, Congress should not tolerate ad
hoc income averaging under the current tax system, even if a
comprehensive system for averaging is desirable.I09
This Article is a refinement and extension of the prior article; it
describes deferred compensation as having two componentscompensation and investment. Current law adequately taxes the
compensation component if the employee's tax bracket does not
change. When the employee's tax bracket does change, current law
fails. To remedy that failure, the prior article argued that all deferred
compensation payments should be taxed at a single rate, namely the
highest marginal rate for individuals.
However, the prior article's proposal only cures the failure of
current law to tax the compensation component; this Article addresses
the investment component of deferred compensation as well. To keep
the present analysis as simple as possible, the remainder of this Article
will assume that the employee and employer do not face changing tax
rates over time, facilitating a focus on the failure to tax the investment
element of deferred compensation.

Ill.

HOW CURRENT LAW FAILS TOTAX THE INVESTMENT ELEMENT
OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION

A.

Bifurcating Deferred Compensation

This Article's model is to evaluate current law by reference to the
compensation and investment components of deferred compensation.
These components are identified by determining actual yet separate
compensation and investment transactions that replicate the employee's
cash flows from deferred compensation. The separate transactions give

109 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation Over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1 (2005)
(discussing income averaging and similar systems for accommodating life-cycle earnings).
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rise to their own tax treatment, which in the aggregate provide a
normative baseline by which to measure the taxation of deferred
compensation. Thus, in determining whether deferred compensation is
tax-advantaged, the question to ask is whether deferred compensation
results in lower taxes than the equivalent compensation-investment
combination. The following example is used to describe how deferred
compensation can be bifurcated.
Example 9: It is 2008, and Ray Corp. is negotiating compensation
with a senior executive, Emily. In addition to a base level of
compensation, Ray Corp. is willing to either (a) pay Emily additional
compensation of $100,000 in 2009, or (b) promise to pay Emily
$200,000 in 2019 (in lieu of the $100,000 of additional
compensation).

The offer of deferred compensation gives Emily a choice between
pre-tax income of $100,000 today or $200,000 in the future. If Emily
pays tax at the 35% rate, her after-tax choice is between $65,000
today 110 and $130,000 in ten years. 111 Thus, deferred compensation
gives Emily the ability to double her money, on an after-tax basis,
within ten years. This deal is the equivalent of giving her after-tax
interest of about 7 .2%, compounded annually . 112
The investment component from the example is essentially debt
that Emily has extended to Ray Corp. If this de facto debt were formal
debt, Emily would have to pay tax on the interest that accrues, even if
she is a cash-method taxpayer. 113 From Emily's perspective, then, her
after-tax return of 7.2% is equivalent to a before-tax return of about
11%. 114 The before-tax interest rate of 11% is the key to dividing the
actual deferred-compensation contract into hypothetically separate
compensation and debt components. This is done by assuming that the
following occurred.
Compensation Component: Ray Corp. pays current (2009)
compensation to Emily of $100,000, leaving Emily with $65,000 aftertax.
Debt Component: Emily loans the after-tax proceeds of $65,000
back to her employer, Ray Corp., for ten years at about 11% annual
interest. Ray Corp. pays Emily enough cash interest to cover her tax
bill on the interest income (3.8%) and adds the remaining interest
(7.2%) to principal. Thus, Emily receives no net cash while the loan is
outstanding. In 2019, Ray Corp. pays Emily principal and capitalized
$100,000 less 35% tax of$35,000 = $65,000.
$200,000 less 35% tax of$70,000 = $130,000.
$65,000 x (I + 0.072) 10 = $130,000. A more precise estimate of the interest rate is given
1110
by 2 - 1 = 7.177%.
113 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
114 As always, this Article assumes that Emily pays tax at the 35% rate. Using the more
precise estimate from note 112, the equivalent pre-tax rate is (2 1110 - 1) I 0.65 = 11.042%.
110
Ill
112
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interest of $130,000.
From Emily's perspective, these two transactions are economically
equivalent to the deferred-compensation transaction, because both yield
after-tax cash of$130,000 in 2019.
As argued above, the tax treatment of the bifurcated transaction
should be the normative baseline in judging whether current law
properly taxes deferred compensation. 115 Thus, it is possible to judge
the adequacy of current law by comparing how the IRS fares with
deferred compensation versus the bifurcated transaction. Ideally, the
IRS's net claim should be the same from the two economically
equivalent transactions. The next two subparts will show that current
law adequately taxes the wage component of deferred compensation,
but fails to tax the debt component at all.
B.

The Compensation Element of Deferred Compensation

Returning to Example 9 above, this Article will now specify Ray
Corp.'s tax rate.
Example I 0: It is 2008, and Ray Corp. is negotiating compensation
with a senior executive, Emily. Ray Corp. will pay Emily additional
compensation of $100,000 in 2009, or promise to pay Emily
$200,000 in 2019 (in lieu of the $100,000 of additional
compensation). The parties choose the deferred compensation.
Emily faces a marginal tax rate of 35%, but Ray Corp. faces a rate of
only 20%.

Because of the difference in tax rates, payments from Ray Corp. to
Emily result in net revenue to the IRS. Ray Corp. gets a deduction
worth twenty cents for every dollar paid, but Emily must pay tax of
thirty-five cents for every dollar received. On a net basis, then, the IRS
gets fifteen cents of every dollar paid.
So, if there was no deferral, and Ray Corp. paid Emily $100,000 in
2009, the IRS would get an immediate claim of$15,000. If instead Ray
Corp. and Emily deferred the 2009 compensation, the IRS's claim
would be $30,000 (i.e., 15% of $200,000) in 2019. Just like Emily, the
IRS sees its money double from 2009 to 2019. The IRS is "due"
$15,000 in 2009, but it gets $30,000 in 2019 if the compensation is
deferred.

115

See infra Part III .A.
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After-Tax Consequences of Current 2009 Compensation

2009 Compensation
2009 Tax
2009 Deduction
2009 Net

Emily
$100,000
($35,000)
$65,000

Ray Corp.
($100,000)
$20,000
($80,000)

IRS
$35,000
($20,000)
$15,000

After-Tax Consequences of Deferred 2019 Compensation

2019 Compensation
2019 Tax
2019 Deduction
2019 Net

Emily
$200,000
($70,000)
$130,000

Ray Corp.
($200,000)
$40,000
($160,000)

IRS
$70,000
($40,000)
$30,000

Because the IRS gets the same deal as Emily, it is given the full
value of its claim to the compensation element of deferred
compensation. Implicit in this assertion is the unorthodox step of
measuring the IRS's time-value-of-money claim using an after-tax rate
of return agreed to by private parties. Ordinarily, the IRS pays and
receives interest according to rates set by statute. 116 As a normative
matter, however, an arms-length rate set by private parties is a superior
measure. Indeed, the market rate of return implied by Emily and Ray
Corp.'s contract should reflect the risks that Ray Corp. will not pay
Emily in 2019, in which case the IRS (like Emily) will receive nothing
from its compensation claim. In short, the IRS is deferring its
compensation claim on the same terms as Emily, making it entitled to
the same after-tax return that Emily receives.
Even if the IRS's claim is valued according to the return agreed
upon by Emily and Ray Corp., using the after-tax return of 7.2% might
seem inappropriate. Why should the IRS be limited to the after-tax
return when it is functionally tax exempt? The answer lies in the fact
that the IRS would bear an implicit "tax" if it were actually in the
business of lending money. Recall that the IRS is deferring its 2009
116 See I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6611, 6621 (West 2010) (describing interest paid and received by the
IRS on overpayment and underpayment of taxes); see also Rev. Rul. 2008-10, 2008-13 I.R.B. 676
(announcing rates for second quarter of2008).
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claim of $15,000 to 2019. Now, if Emily could borrow $15,000 from
the IRS for ten years to finance her debt investment in Ray Corp., she
would presumably be entitled to an interest deduction. 117 Were Emily
to pay deductible interest of 11% to the IRS, the IRS would keep only
7.2% on a net basis, because Emily would take a deduction that reduces
her net interest expense from 11% to 7.2%. 11 8 The difference of 3.8%
burdens the IRS because it reduces other revenue the IRS would receive
from Emily. 11 9 Thus, the after-tax return earned by Emily of7.2% is the
appropriate rate of interest to measure the IRS's compensation claim.
Under this analysis, then, the IRS does in fact get its proper share
of the compensation element of deferred compensation. Ideally, the
IRS would receive its claim to the compensation element upon initial
deferral (2009 in the example). Instead, the IRS gets an equivalent
amount when deferred compensation is actually paid (20 19 in the
example). Although there may be other plausible approaches to valuing
the compensation element, the one given above has the advantage of
simplicity. In fact, it is not even necessary to identify the actual aftertax interest rate used by Emily and Ray Corp. or the amount of 2009
compensation deferred. That rate is implied by the deal struck by the
private parties, and the IRS will always be made whole at the time of
ultimate payment. 120 All that is needed is to ensure that the payment of
deferred compensation is taxed as it is under current law.
C.

The Investment Element of Deferred Compensation

Recall that the normative baseline for taxing deferred
compensation is based on what the IRS would receive if the parties
structured their transaction as an equivalent combination of current
compensation followed by a debt (investment) transaction.
As
discussed, current law gives the IRS its claim to the compensation
element of deferred compensation, but does not go any farther. Thus, it
fails to give the IRS any claim at all to the investment element, which is
inherently valuable. To see what the IRS loses under current law,

117 In this case, this Article assumes that Emily has borrowed these funds in order to make her
investment in Ray Corp. If that is the case, the interest is deductible as investment interest. See
I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A).
118 II% less the 35% tax is 7.2%.
119 It is possible to establish the appropriateness of using the 7.2% rate through another
method. Ray Corp.'s equivalent before-tax rate is 9.0% because 9.0% less 20% is 7.2%. Were
the IRS to pay taxable interest of 9.0% to Ray Corp., the IRS would face a net payment of only
7.2%. Because the 9.0% interest is taxable to Ray Corp, 20% of the payment goes to the IRS as
tax revenue.
120 The IRS does lose, however, if the employee's tax rate falls after the initial deferral. Cf
Chason, supra note 6.
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consider again the example of deferred compensation and the
economically equivalent transactions, which produce the same cash
flows and economic risks for Emily as does deferred compensation.
Because Emily is indifferent between deferred compensation and the
equivalent transactions, any additional taxes from the equivalent
transaction are borne by Ray Corp. That is consistent with the ultimate
proposal of this Article to levy a special tax on the employer only. 121
Recall that in Example 10, deferred compensation offers Emily a
$200,000 payment in 2019 in lieu of a $100,000 payment in 2009.
Assuming that Ray Corp. pays tax at a 20% rate and Emily at 35%, the
investment (debt element) can be determined by the following
economically equivalent transactions:
Example 11: The following transactions are, from Emily's
perspective, economically equivalent to the deferred compensation
described in Example I 0:

Compensation Element: Ray Corp. pays Emily $100,000 in
compensation. After tax, Emily keeps $65,000.
Investment (Debt) Element: Emily loans $65,000 back to Ray Corp.
at a taxable rate of about II%, for a period of ten years. After tax,
this 11% rate is 7.2%; that doubles Emily's money in ten years and
she receives $130,000 in 2019. This amount is what Emily would
have netted had she received a taxable $200,000 payment of deferred
compensation in 2019.

As discussed above, current law gives the IRS its proper share of
the compensation element. Even though the IRS must wait to receive
its share until 2019, it is adequately compensated. The IRS's other
claim is to the debt component of the equivalent transaction, and the
IRS receives nothing for this claim under current law. The following
chart describes what the IRS should be receiving. Its right-hand column
of shows the cash flows to the IRS from the investment (debt) element
in Example 11:

121

See infra Part IV.B.
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Table 1

Year

Loan
Balance
(grows at
-7.2%)122

2009

$65,000

2010
2011

Pretax
Interest
(-11%)I23

Emily's
Taxon
Interest

Ray
Corp.'s
Deduction
for

NetiRS
Claim

(35%)

$7,177

$2,512

$(1,435)

$1,077

69,665

7,692

2,692

(1,538)

1,154

74,665

8,245

2,886

(1,649)

1,237

2012

80,024

8,836

3,093

(1,767)

1,325

2013

85,768

9,471

3,315

(1,894)

1,421

2014

91,924

10,150

3,553

(2,030)

1,523

2015

98,522

10,879

3,808

(2,176)

1,632

2016

105,593

11,660

4,081

(2,332)

1,749

2017

113,172

12,496

4,374

(2,499)

1,874

2018

121,294

13,393

4,688

(2,679)

2,009

2019

130,000

Thus, the debt component of the equivalent transaction produces a
series of positive, net claims for the IRS from 2009 through 2018. The
IRS should be receiving these periodic amounts (or their lump-sum
equivalent), regardless of whether the private parties structure their deal
as deferred compensation or the equivalent compensation/debt
combination. Because current law gives the IRS only its claim to the
compensation component, it essentially negates the IRS's claim to the
debt or investment component of deferred compensation.
Note that the tax advantage of deferred compensation turns on the
difference in the parties' tax rates, precisely because it is this difference
that gives value to the IRS's claim to interest. If the employer and
employee have the same tax rate, there is no advantage to deferred
compensation, as interest passing between two equivalent-rate taxpayers
produces no revenue for the IRS. If the employer has a lower rate,
however, deferred compensation is advantageous because the benefit to
the employee (tax-exempt interest) outweighs the burden to the

122 Each period the loan balance increases by the after-tax interest rate. In the text, this is
described as 7.2%, but a more precise estimate that will replicate the numbers in the charts is
7.177%. Seesupranote 112.
123 A more precise estimate of the interest rate that will replicate the numbers in the chart is
11.042%. See supra note 114.
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employer (foregone interest deduction).
In essence, deferred
compensation allows the employer to give tax-exempt interest to the
employee, so long as the employer forgoes its own interest deduction.
This result is consistent with other works that have viewed
deferred compensation as an investment conduit by which low-tax
corporations invest on behalf of high-tax employees. 124 The tax benefit
is proportionate to the difference in tax rates between the parties. That
being said, there are two advantages to the current approach. The first
advantage is theoretical, in that it does not depend on the existence of a
rabbi trust or other funding.
Deferred compensation implies an
investment contract between employer and employee. This contractnot any actual or hypothetical funding-is what should be taxed. The
second advantage is pragmatic in that it allows for the development of a
special tax levied on the payment of deferred compensation. As
suggested earlier, the failure of current law to tax the interest
component of deferred compensation creates unjustifiable tax planning
opportunities. 12 5 Remedying this failure is the goal of this Article.

IV.

APPLYING A SPECIAL TAX UPON PAYMENT
OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION

A

Goals of the Special Tax

Any proposal to cure the failures of current law must be
administrable as applied to a wide range of taxpayers and deferred
compensation arrangements. Moreover, any proposal should give
employers and employees maximum freedom in structuring their
economic deals. Thus, Congress should neither attempt to outlaw
deferred compensation nor encourage it. Instead, Congress should tax
deferred compensation according to the compensation and investment
components that replicate the cash flows the employee receives from
deferred compensation. Using simple debt as a prototypical investment
transaction, Part III of this Article demonstrated how current law fails to
tax the investment component and reiterated the call made by other
scholars to impose a special tax on deferred compensation.
Debt is the motivating example in the development of the special
tax, but this Article will extend the debt model to a variety of deferred
compensation plans that do not have debt as their investment
component. 126 For now, though, the task is to develop a special tax that

See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
126 See supra Part III.B.
124
125
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gives the IRS its appropriate claim to the interest that passes from
employer to employee in a debt-based deferred compensation plan.
This tax is a special tax on the employer, levied at the time of
actual payment, which equals revenue that the IRS should receive from
the interest inherent in deferred-compensation contract. There are two
design constraints on this special tax: ( 1) that it be imposed on the
employer only, and (2) that it be imposed at the time when actual
payment is made under the deferred compensation contract. These
considerations are explained in more detail as follows.
B.

Taxing the Employer Only

Taxing the employer is justified because the employer is almost
certainly in a better administrative position to calculate and pay the tax
than are individual employees. Moreover, the goal of most deferred
compensation arrangements is to prevent employees from facing any tax
consequences before the time of final payment. Levying the special tax
on the employee would probably prompt employers to provide
additional compensation to the employee to cover the extra tax bill. So,
levying the special tax on the employer is consistent with the goals of
the private parties and allows them to avoid the unnecessary expense of
contractually shifting the incidence of the tax to the employer. There is
nothing wrong with facilitating this goal, so long as the IRS's net claim
is not affected.
The employer's role is not limited to being a tax proxy or
withholding agent for the employee. The employer is also the actual
debtor, accruing an interest expense under the deferred compensation
contract. Current law does not allow an interest deduction, precisely
because the interest income is not taxable to the employee.I 27 If interest
income becomes taxable, then the employer's interest expense should
be deductible.
The employer's two roles (proxy for the employee and debtor)
dictate the tax rate to be applied for the special tax. Deferred
compensation is concentrated almost entirely on highly paid
employees. 128 Under the reasonable assumption that all beneficiaries of
127 See Albertson's, Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 415 (1990) (holding for Commissioner), ajf'd, 42
F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994).
128 A. THOMAS 8RJSENDINE ET AL., TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 385-4TH: DEFERRED
COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS § DCA. ("Strange as it may seem at first glance, unfunded
deferred compensation plans for rank-and-file employees are illegal, even where the employer's
intention is to confer a benefit that it would not otherwise provide."). Deferred compensation,
being an unfunded ERISA retirement plan, can be established only for "a select group of
management or highly compensated employees." Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), § 30l(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (2006). So-called excess benefit plans under
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deferred compensation are executives paying the top marginal rate, the
top rate applies when taxing the employer as proxy for the employee.
Since the employer is the actual debtor, it should simply take an
income-tax deduction for the interest expense it incurs. So if the
employer also faces the top marginal rate, the two components will
offset one another. This is as it should be, because the IRS ordinarily
has no claim to interest passing from taxpayers at the same marginal
rate. As the employer's tax rate falls, the IRS's debt claim will grow
larger. At the extreme, the IRS's debt claim is worth a full 35% of
interest paid if the employer is tax exempt.
C.

Taxing Deferred Compensation Only upon Payment

The proposed special tax has another design constraint-it is levied
only when the employer makes an actual payment to the employee.
This timing rule is inconsistent with the usual taxation of debt, which is
subject to annual taxation as interest passes between the parties. 129 One
rationale for imposing the tax on the back end is to avoid taxpayer
resistance against paying tax on "phantom" income. Another is that it
avoids difficult issues that would arise if the employer defaulted on its
deferred compensation obligation. Had the employer taken periodic
interest deductions, it would arguably have cancellation of indebtedness
income upon default. Conversely, the employee (or the employer, as
proxy) could conceivably claim a loss deduction after paying tax on the
interest.
Perhaps most importantly, a back-end tax avoids the cumbersome
task of periodically valuing the deferred compensation obligation. An
annual, periodic tax would require that a value be placed on the promise
starting at the time of initial deferral. Yet the value of the initial
promise may be difficult to discern, particularly if the contract is not
structured as debt. Deferred compensation is often structured to give
employees a payout that is dependent upon the employer's profitability
or the performance of external investments (like a stock market index).
The ultimate payment in deferred compensation is known, because that
is what the Code currently taxes. Even if structured as debt, deferred
compensation plans may not have clear values before the time of actual
payment. The parties simply might not oblige the IRS with the initial

ERISA § 3(36) can be offered outside this "select group," but they are quite narrow and rare in
practice. See BRISENDINE, supra, § DCA. (noting that excess benefit plans are not a common
refuge from the requirements of ERISA); id. §II. G. ("An excess benefit plan must be maintained
'solely' for the purpose of providing benefits in excess of the [IRC] § 415 limits and the
limitation will, in all likelihood, be construed narrowly.").
129 See supra notes 67-68 (discussing original-issue discount).
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value of the contract as Emily and Ray Corp. have done in the
examples. For example, an employer might promise to pay $200,000 in
2019 without declaring the 2009 value of the promise. A back-end tax,
as proposed here, can be levied in 2019 based on the $200,000 payment
without knowing the initial value of the promise.t3o
Because the special tax applies only upon ultimate payment of
deferred compensation, it must be levied on the future value of the
investment component that is implicit in the deferred compensation
contract. This Article will term this future value the "lump-sum
interest," as interest-bearing debt is the motivating example for the
special tax. Ordinarily, interest is taxed as it accrues, but the special tax
will wait until completion of the contract. The employer would pay a
nondeductible tax on the lump-sum interest at the highest rate for
individuals (currently 35%). The assumption that all employees
accruing deferred compensation are taxed at the 35% rate is close to
reality,13 1 and is necessary to administer a special tax on payment to the
employee. The 35% tax on the lump-sum interest amount reflects the
value of the tax that should have been collected from the employee over
the course of the deferred-compensation contract. The employer pays
this tax as proxy for the employee.
At the same time it pays this tax, the employer can take a
deduction for the lump-sum interest. This amount reflects the future
value of the deductions that the employer should have been taking over
the course of the contract. Ideally, the employer would have been
deducting interest throughout the life of the contract, and the lump-sum
deduction at the end may yield different results because the employer's
tax rate may vary from year to year. Corporations do, however, have
substantial (although imperfect) income averaging through the use of
net operating losses, 132 which stabilize the marginal tax rate-measured
in economic terms-that corporations pay. Also, it is likely that
employers have fairly stable annual expenses related to deferred
compensation, suggesting that the actual interest incurred under
deferred compensation is close to the lump-sum interest deducted under
the special tax proposal. In summary, and as with the assumption that
all beneficiaries of deferred compensation pay a tax of 35% tax,
granting the interest deduction in the year of actual payment does not
perfectly capture the results from taxing annual interest. Yet it is a
close approximation that achieves an administrable result.

130 See supra Part III.A.
131 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.

132 Cf Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REv. 745,
768-69 (2007).
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Calculating Lump-Sum Interest

In order to calculate the lump-sum interest, it is first necessary to

identify the periodic interest that should be subject to tax. Example 11
above describes the periodic interest passing from Ray Corp. to Emily,
but it is important to describe this interest in more conceptual terms. As
a practical matter, it is possible to identify the periodic interest by the
after-tax interest rate implied by the parties' transaction and the beforetax amount of compensation deferred. 133 In the prior example, the
before-tax interest rate implied by the parties was about 7 .2%, and the
before-tax deferral was $100,000. Thus, about $7200 of interest should
be taxed by the IRS in the first year of deferral (2009), as confirmed in
Example 11.
Because interest is being capitalized, the amount of interest grows
every year; the growth rate is the same as the interest rate, or 7 .2%.
Thus, in the second year of deferral (20 10), about $7700 in interest is
incurred, and subsequent years' interest has the same growth rate. The
chart in Table 1 confirms the accuracy of these estimates. Thus, the
IRS's claim can be described as a growing annuity that starts at $7200,

133 Conceptually, this approach commits two wrongs that do make a right. The IRS's debt
claim is based on the before-tax interest rate implied by the private parties' transaction and the
after-tax amount of compensation deferred. The reason for using the before-tax rate of interest
should be obvious, as the Code imposes tax on, and often allows deductions for, private-party
interest. Using the numbers from the example, the before-tax interest rate is about ll% ("grossed
up" from 7.2%). The reason for using this before-tax rate is a bit cumbersome because the
interest rate implied by the transaction is an after-tax return, but the special tax should be based
on a before-tax return. Theoretically, then, the special tax works only if the implicit interest is
appropriately "grossed up."
Recall that in the example, Ray Corp. is providing an after-tax return of about 7.2%, which
doubles Emily's money over ten years. If the goal is to give an employee a 7.2% after-tax return,
then the tax cannot be based on interest of 7.2%. Instead, it is necessary to increase the taxable
interest rate to II%; after the imposition of a 35% tax on interest of II%, the employee is left
with 7.2%. In essence, the special tax proposed in this Article would allow the employee to keep
the 7.2% of interest "tax free," but force the employer to pay tax on the grossed up (II%) interest
as the employee's proxy or withholding agent. This yields precisely the same result for the IRS
as if Emily herself were personally taxed on interest of II%. Emily keeps 7.2% as capitalized
interest, and the remaining 3.8% represents a claim held by the IRS.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to gross up the interest rates directly when calculating the
special tax. Recall in the example that deferred compensation is bifurcated into a wage and debt
transaction, using Emily's 35% marginal tax rate in both transactions. In the wage transaction, it
was assumed that Ray Corp. paid her $100,000, but that Emily paid $35,000 of cash. So, Emily
loans $65,000 to Ray Corp. in the debt transaction, in which the before-tax rate of 7.2% was
grossed up to 11%. In short, the special tax on after-tax compensation ($65,000) and before-tax
interest (II%) is conceptually based. It is possible to equivalently base the special tax on beforetax compensation ($100,000) and after-tax interest (7.2%). Either method produces the same
amount of taxable interest. The second method is more administrable, however, as it allows for
the calculation of the amount of taxable interest implied by the deferred compensation contract
without knowing the employee's marginal tax rate.
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and is subject to a growth and interest rate of7.2%, lasting for ten years.
With this conceptual description of the interest rate, it is possible to use
a future-value formula to find the 2019 value of these interest payments,
which is about $135,000. 134 Calculations relying on future-value
formulas may be too unwieldy. For that reason, discussion of the
formulas is left to the Appendix, while this Article proposes that the
lump-sum interest be calculated in the following-hopefully more
intuitive-manner.
Interest Rate: The mechanics of determining the lump-sum interest
rate become simpler if the interest rate is adjusted slightly. In the
example, before-tax interest rate implied by the private parties is about
7 .2%, using annual compounding. 135 A continuously compounded
interest rate allows for a simpler calculation. In Example 12, the
equivalent continuously compounded interest rate is 6.9%.136
Lump-Sum Interest: With the change to a continuously
compounded interest rate, it is possible to drop the future-value
formulas and value the lump-sum interest through an equivalent yet
more intuitive process. Under this process, the lump-sum interest
equals the product of:
the final pre-tax payment ($200,000),
the continuously compounded interest rate (6.9%), and
the number of years that the deferred compensation contract was
outstanding (10 years).

These steps look remarkably like the way one computes simple,
uncompounded interest. Yet it produces essentially the same result as
the more sophisticated future-value formula. In the example, this yields
a lump-sum interest of $200,000 x 6.9% x 10 = $138,000, roughly the
same result derived above. 137 The difference is due to the switch from
annual to continuous compounding.
The remaining steps are straightforward. The employer deducts
the lump-sum interest in the year of payment, but must pay a
nondeductible special tax on the lump-sum interest at the same time. In
1
134 The future value of a growing annuity is A x n x (l+i)"- , where A is the initial annuity, n
is the number of years, and i is the interest (and growth) rate. See Wikipedia, Time
Value of Money, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_value_of_money#Future_value_of_a_
growing_annuity (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) ("Where i = g"). So, the future value is $7200 x 10
10 1
X (1.072) " = $134,613.
135 Careful readers may detect an apparent inconsistency. Earlier, this Article proposed that
the special tax should be based on the before-tax rate of interest, whereas here this Article bases
the calculation on the after-tax rate of interest. This is true, although Step Two compensates for
this by assuming that the implied loan is of the before-tax amount of $200,000. These two
"wrongs" essentially cancel each other out, and allow for simpler computational steps. Readers
who desire a more rigorous explanation should consult the Appendix.
136 Recall that a 7.2% rate doubles money over ten years with annual compounding. A 6.9%
rate does the same with continuous compounding as e 10 ' 0·069 = 2. A more precise estimate is
ln(2) I lO = 6.9315.
137 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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the example, Ray Corp. gets a 2019 deduction worth $138,000 x 20% =
$27,600, but must pay a 2019 special tax of$138,000 x 35% = $48,300.
The net claim of the IRS is the difference between the two, which is
$20,700 in the example.l38
Note that the special-tax regime will not always produce revenue
for the IRS. If the employer pays tax at the 35% tax rate, the value of
its deduction will precisely offset the cost of the special tax. Earlier in
this Article, it was shown that differences in the tax rates between
employer and employee create a tax advantage for deferred
compensation. The special tax proposed in this Article curtails that
advantage, without burdening further deferred compensation.

V.

APPLYING THE SPECIAL TAX TO DIVERSE DEFERRED
COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS

The previous Part proposed a special tax that would apply to a
simple, debt-based, deferred-compensation arrangement. Such simple
arrangements are found in practice, but so too are others not easily
classified as straight debt. The goal of this Part is to extend the special
tax to the fullest possible array of deferred compensation arrangements
used in practice.
A

Statutory Versus Contractual Interest Rates

In the prior example, the actual contractual rate of interest was
used to calculate the lump-sum interest amount. Determining the actual
contract rate of interest may not always be feasible. For example, the
deferred compensation may be expressed simply as a promise to pay an
amount in the future (e.g., $200,000 in 2019). It is not possible to
extrapolate the implied interest rate without knowing the equivalent
amount of current compensation (e.g., $100,000 in 2009).
Moreover, the private parties cannot be expected to provide
reliable information about the equivalent amount of current
compensation. Because the special tax depends on the interest rate, the
parties would have an incentive to manipulate any information they
provide in order to depress the interest rate implicit in deferred
compensation.
Example 12: Emily and Ray Corp. purport that Emily is deferring
$180,000 in 2009 in exchange for a payment of $200,000 in 2019.

138

$48,300- $27,600.
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The interest rate implied by the parties' contract is about I%.139

If the form of Emily and Ray Corp.'s contract were respected, the
special tax would result in a net tax cost to Ray Corp. of $3000. 140 In
contrast, Example 11 assumed a $200,000 payment in 2019 but a 6.9%
interest rate. This higher interest rate resulted in a net tax on Ray Corp.
of $27,000. 141 The variance comes from the fact that the special tax is
directly proportionate to the assumed interest rate.
Another difficulty would arise from contractual rates that vary over
time despite very good information about the initial value of the
deferred compensation. A common deferred compensation arrangement
has the employee electively defer salary or bonus payments, and the
employer would then credit the deferred compensation to a notional
account, which would be periodically adjusted for interest credits. Yet
the interest credits might not be fixed, being based instead on an
adjustable rate like the prime interest rate or LIBOR. 142 Taxing the
exact amount of interest would require the employer and the IRS to
track interest as it fluctuates, a task tantamount to imposing the tax on a
periodic basis. Indeed, a periodic tax may work well when an employer
sets aside an identifiable account for an employee and credits it with a
reasonable rate of interest. In other contexts, however, a periodic tax
will not work so well. 14 3 For the sake of uniformity, this Article's
proposal would subject all deferred compensation plans to the special
tax only upon actual payment, rather than periodically.
To avoid the difficulty of varying interest rates or employer
manipulation, the special tax should be based on a statutory rate of
interest. The Internal Revenue Code commonly uses statutory rates in
imputing interest to transactions, with perhaps the closest parallel being
the taxation of loans between employer and employee bearing belowmarket interest. 144 The solution of§ 7872 is to impute interest to belowmarket loans at a statutorily prescribed, "applicable Federal rate," 14 5 or
AFR. For example, the long-term AFR for December 2008 is 4.45%, 146
implying an after-tax interest rate of about 2.9%. 147 There are potential
A closer estimate is 1.06% as $180,000 x 1.0106 10 = $200,000.
140 The lump-sum interest is I% x I 0 x $200,000 = $20,000. The 35% proxy tax would be
$7000. The deduction, assuming a 20% rate, would be worth $4000. The difference between the
two, $3000, is the IRS's net claim.
141 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142 LIBOR is the London Interbank Offer Rate and is a short-term rate used by banks
borrowing from one another and to value derivative contracts. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 40,
at 551.
143 See supra Part li.A.
144 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(I)(B) (West 2010).
145 l.R.C. § 7872(f)(2).
146 See Rev. Rut. 2008-53, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1231.
147 The 4.45% rate is reduced by 35% to arrive at the equivalent after-tax rate. The AFR
represents a before-tax interest rate because the interest imputed by § 7872 is includible to the
139
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objections to using a discount AFR in calculating the special tax in light
of the nature of deferred compensation and common employer
practices.
One reason that AFR may not be appropriate for levying the
special tax is that it is based on the cost of borrowing to the United
States government. 148 Deferred compensation is long-term corporate,
not government, borrowing, and is analogous to a bond or debenture.
Investment-grade corporate bonds carry a higher rate of interest than
U.S. government debt, reflecting their lower liquidity and higher risk of
default. 149 The Code already uses corporate-bond yields to determine
funding levels for qualified retirement plans, 150 and those yields could
serve as the basis for the special tax. By way of comparison to the
4.45% AFR noted above, the "composite corporate bond rate" for
November 2008 was 7.72%.151
The interest rate used above was the after-tax return implied by the
deferred compensation plan. Presumably, then, the statutory rate for
levying the special tax should similarly be reduced to an after-tax rate.
After all, the yield on corporate bonds is taxed as ordinary income. Yet
deferred compensation often bears rates of return above what could be
achieved in the market. The method of granting above-market returns
can be express, such as when firms promise interest rates that are
objectively higher than any market index, 152 or when employers offer
investment returns that replicate the tax-exempt returns of their 40l(k)
plans. 15 3 In short, employers frequently augment the investment return
on deferred compensation, providing after-tax returns that are the same
or higher than market-based before-tax returns.
One might argue that the augmented return is actually "camouflage
compensation" 154 and thus not appropriately taxed as interest.
However, the camouflage compensation is being structured as interest
in this example, making it appropriate to tax it as such. Moreover, the
additional return may well be a default premium that the employee
enjoys. A cornerstone of deferred compensation, the economic benefit

lender and potentially deductible by the borrower. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 17, ~
55.3.2 ("The lender has gross interest income equal to the forgone interest, and the borrower has
an interest deduction in like amount if all of the limitations on deductions for interest are
satisfied.").
148 See I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(C).
149 See BODlE ET AL., supra note 40,477, 496.
150 See I.R.C. § 430(h)(2)(C).
151 See I.R.S. Notice 2008-112, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1301.
152 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 102 (2004).
153 See CLARK CONSULTING, EXECUTNE BENEFITS: SURVEY OF CURRENT TRENDS 14
(2007), http://www.clarkconsulting.com/resource/surveys/ebsurvey/pdfs/2007_benefit_survey_
results. pdf.
154 Cf BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 152 (arguing that deferred compensation is a method of
camouflaging excess compensation of executives).
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doctrine provides that the employee must bear the risk of default if the
employer becomes insolvent or bankrupt, even if the employer sets
aside funds for the employee.l 55 Similarly, the fact that deferred
compensation is illiquid may also justify premiums above market rates.
Thus, this Article would tentatively propose using a long-term, beforetax market rate of interest to calculate the special tax, while recognizing
the need for greater study into common employer practices.
B.

Phantom Stock and Other Non-Debt Deferred Compensation

Up to this point, this Article has assumed that the investment
component of deferred compensation is functionally debt. However, the
investment component of deferred compensation is often structured to
replicate an equity investment, such as employer stock. Part V.B. will
extend the special-tax analysis to non-debt deferred compensation,
arguing that the special proposed above can be applied to equity-based
arrangements without modification.
If the investment component is in employer equity, the
arrangement is known as "phantom stock," which replicates the benefits
of outright ownership of employer equity. 156 For example, an employer
might promise to pay an employee the value of a thousand shares of
employer stock, ten years after the initial promise. Note that the
employee does not actually own the stock, nor does she have the right to
acquire any actual stock. The employer has simply made an unfunded
promise to pay a future amount, determined by reference to the value of
its stock at the time of payment.
Example 13: In 2009, Ray Corp. promises to pay Emily the value of
10,000 shares of its common stock in 2019. In 2009, Ray Corp.'s
stock is worth $100 per share, and in 20 19 it is worth $400 per share.

Ray Corp. has not delivered any shares (i.e., property) to Emily in
this example. Under the doctrines of constructive receipt and economic
benefit, it has made an unfunded promise to pay in the future, resulting
in no tax consequences until 2019. At that time, Emily will receive a
$4,000,000 pretax payment, leaving her with $2,600,000 if she is a 35%
taxpayer. At the same time, Ray Corp. will pay $4,000,000 pretax,
costing it a net $3,200,000 if it is a 20% taxpayer.
Previously in this Article, the special tax was developed with the
assumption that deferred compensation contains a debt component.
155 See supra note 18 (describing the economic benefit doctrine, which subjects employees to
immediate taxation when they no longer face a risk of employer default).
156 See BRISENDINE ET AL., supra note 128, at IJ.E (" A phantom stock plan is yet another form
of incentive compensation, under which an employee is awarded the right to receive a fixed
payment equal to the value of a specified number of shares of employer stock.").
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Remedying the failure of current Jaw to tax this debt component was the
goal of the special tax. Now, however, it is necessary to address a
deferred compensation arrangement that contains an equity-not debtcomponent. Fortunately, a good argument can be made to apply the
special tax in an essentially unaltered form even when the investment
component is not structured as debt. At an intuitive level, a uniform
approach seems not only fair but also easily administrable, removing the
problematic debt/equity distinctions from the world of deferred
compensation.
More formally, it is possible to think of phantom stock as having a
variable payment but otherwise being "debt like." Phantom stock is not
actual ownership of equity, but instead a promise by the employer to
pay an amount in the future. Unlike ordinary debt, however, the
ultimate payment is not a fixed amount based on interest rates. Instead,
it is based on the performance of the employer's stock.
Indeed, financial and tax theory both support the idea of treating
fixed and variable payments equally. The taxation-of-risk literature
demonstrates that the tax burden on risky investments is the same as
that on risk-free investments. 157 Similarly, the method for pricing
forward contracts from financial economics assumes that risky and riskfree payoffs have equivalent value. 158 Since the risky payoff of
phantom stock is equivalent to the fixed payoff of ordinary deferred
compensation, it is appropriate to use the special-tax model developed
above to tax phantom stock.l59
However, these theories do have real-world limitations. For
example, the taxation-of-risk literature assumes that a single, flat rate of
tax applies to all risky investments, and that all loses are fully usable at
that rate. 160 In contrast, the Internal Revenue Code has multiple rates 161
and does not allow for full usability of losses. 162 These real-world
limitations are almost wholly unfriendly to taxpayers when compared
with the idealized world of theory. 163 Accounting for these limitations
in the special tax would, however, be infeasible from an administrative
perspective.164 A practical special tax, based on these theoretical
157 This is the "Domar-Musgrave" theory, summarized by Charlene D. Luke, Taxing Risk: An
Approach to Variable Insurance Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 295-303 (2007).
158 See HULL, supra note 71, at 103-04.
159 This point is made in somewhat more detail infra Appendix, Part II.
160 See Luke, supra note !57, at 295-303.
161 See I.R.C. § !(h) (describing several rates applicable to capital gains) (West 2010).
162 See I.R.C. § 1211.
163 One taxpayer-fiiendly intrusion from the real world is the step up in basis that applies to
inherited property. See I.R.C. § 1014. The step up does not apply to phantom stock and other
deferred compensation because it is income in respect of a decedent. See I.R.C. § 1014(c).
164 Phantom stock can be re-characterized as ordinary deferred compensation combined with a
forward contract to purchase the stock. Cf Yale & Polsky, supra note 6, at 616 (equating
phantom stock plans with a combination of current compensation, debt, and forward contract).
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models, may well under-tax the investment component of phantom
stock, as it will not account for these taxpayer-unfriendly elements of
the Code. However, the Code does not currently tax the investment
component at all. While the special tax proposed here may not fully tax
the investment component of phantom stock, it does not result in overtaxation and is an improvement over current law.
The mechanics of applying the special tax to phantom stock are the
same as before. It is first necessary to identify the appropriate interest
rate. In prior examples, a rate of 6.9%, compounded continuously, was
used. Next, the product of the interest rate (6.9%), the duration of the
contract (ten years), and the final value of the contract ($4,000,000)
arrives at a lump-sum interest amount of $2,760,000. 165 Ray Corp. then
pays a special tax on the lump-sum interest at the highest marginal rate.
At a 35% rate, the tax is $966,000. Ray Corp. then deducts the lumpsum interest. If Ray Corp. is at the 20% rate, the deduction is worth
$552,000. On a net basis, Ray Corp. must pay $414,000 of extra tax to
the IRS.
C.

Measuring the Duration ofDeferred-Compensation Contracts

The proposed special tax turns on three inputs: an interest rate, the
amount actually paid to the employee, and the duration of the contract.
This Article has already studied the first two inputs, 166 but it has taken
the duration of the contract for granted in prior examples. However, the
duration of the contract is worthy of additional consideration given its
ambiguous nature in some arrangements.
The special tax relies on the idea that the employee "earns" the
right to compensation before it is actually paid. The cash-method of
accounting, however, allows the employee to defer the tax
consequences of compensation until actual payment. A byproduct of
this deferral is that current law fails to tax the investment income that
accrues from the time the compensation is earned until it is paid, and the
special tax attempts to remedy this failure by imposing an additional tax
at the time of actual payment. The duration of the contract, which is
needed to levy the special tax, is the period between the earning and the
payment of compensation.
One problem in measuring the duration of the contract arises when
an employee has not perfected the right to future payment. For
example, future payment might be contingent upon the employee's
Fully taxing phantom stock would require bifurcation into these two constituent contracts along
with applying loss limitations and the like to the forward contract.
165 0.069 X )0 X 4,000,000 = 2,760,000.
166 See supra Parts IV.D, V.A.
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continued service or the employer's profitability. The Code and
regulations already have rules that measure just this issue under § 83.
Section 83 taxes the transfer of property when rights to the property are
"substantially vested," meaning that the property is either transferable
or not subject to a "substantial risk of forfeiture." 167 A substantial risk
of forfeiture exists when rights in the property are conditioned upon the
employee's future performance of substantial services or the employer's
future profitability .168 Section 83 applies by its terms to transfers of
property, not to unfunded promises. Nevertheless, the "substantial risk
of forfeiture" concept can be readily applied to promises to determine
when they are earned by the employee.
A more mechanical problem arises when an employee accrues
benefits under a single plan of deferred compensation over multiple
years. For example, an employee might defer compensation into a
single account over several years, much in the same way that employees
defer compensation into 401 (k) plans. Over the years, the account will
(hopefully) grow from investment performance and additional deferrals.
Future payments will have been earned over several years, making the
measurement of contract duration difficult-yet possible with the
competent use of a spreadsheet program.
Measuring contract duration for defined benefit plans, is even more
difficult, though, as illustrated by the following example:
Example 14: In 2009, Ray Corp. promises to pay Emily an annual
annuity upon reaching age sixty-five equal to 2% of her average
annual compensation multiplied by her years of service. In 2019,
Emily retires at age sixty with an average annual compensation of
$1,000,000 and twenty years of service, entitling her to an annuity of
$400,000 per year, starting at age sixty-five. In 2024, Emily starts
receiving her benefit of $400,000 per year.

There is no easy way to know the contract duration in 2019 when
Emily retires. The special tax was originally designed to apply to
discrete annual promises. To apply the special tax to defined-benefit
plans would require the disaggregation of the $200,000 pension into ten
separate promises. Doing so is theoretically possible if it is possible to
examine the benefit that Emily has accrued every year, 169 though it
would require resorting to actuarial assumptions about the value of her
benefits.
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (as amended in 2005).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) (1978).
169 For example, suppose Emily has an average compensation of $1,000,000 throughout her
tenure at Ray Corp. In 2009, with ten years of service, her earned benefit is $200,000 per year at
age 65 . Every year to follow she earns an additional year of service and an additional $20,000
benefit. It is possible to view the initial $200,000 and the subsequent $20,000 benefits as discrete
promises, each having a unique duration. This is a plausible approach, but not a recommended
one for reasons of administrability.
167
168
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However, this Article proposes a simpler solution, which is to treat
all benefits as having been earned ratably while employed. Thus, when
Emily retires in 20 19, the duration of her contract is five years-that is,
half of the ten-year period over which she earned benefits. In 2019,
Emily has already earned all of her benefits, meaning no special
convention is necessary in order to handle the additional five-year
period from 2019 to 2024. Thus, the duration of her contract in 2024 is
ten years (i.e., the sum of the two five-year periods). Payments made in
2024 have a duration of ten years, payments in 2025 have a duration of
eleven years, and so on.
This assumption of ratable accrual can be extended to all deferred
compensation earned by a particular employee, at a particular employer.
Employees will often earn deferred compensation under several
different arrangements with a single employer. Rather than forcing the
employer to track the duration of every deferred compensation
arrangement, this Article proposes that all deferred compensation
arrangements of a single employee be aggregated.
Example 15: Emily started working for Ray Corp. in 1989. From her
promotion to Vice President in 2000 until her retirement in 20 I 0,
Emily accrues benefits under several deferred compensation plans
maintained by Ray Corp. In 2020, Ray Corp. pays Emily a total of
$200,000 under several of its deferred-compensation plans.

This proposal would treat all plans benefiting Emily as a single
plan. When Ray Corp. pays Emily in 2020, a contract duration of
fifteen years is assumed. The clock starts in 2000, when Emily starts
earning benefits. But since it is assumed that Emily earns benefits
ratably while employed, the period from 2000 to 2010 results in an
average contract duration of five years (i.e., one half of the ten-year
period of accrual). Since no benefits accrue after Emily's retirement,
the period from 2010 to 2020 adds ten years to the contract duration.
The total duration of fifteen years can then be used to calculate the
special tax. If the interest rate is 6.9%, the lump-sum interest is
$207,000.'7° As before, Ray Corp. pays a special tax on this amount at
the highest marginal rates for individuals and also deducts this amount
as an interest expense in 2020. Assuming the same rates as before, the
net effect is an additional tax liability for Ray Corp. of $31,050 in
2020. 171

170
171

15 X 6.9% X $200,000 = $207,000.
$207,000 X (35%- 20%) = $31,050.
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CONCLUSION

Conceptually,
deferred compensation is composed of
compensation and investment components. Current law adequately
taxes the compensation component, but it fails to tax the investment
component, creating tax-planning opportunities and all the efficiency
and distributive problems that ensue. 172 The remedy is to tax the
investment component, achieved by imposing a "special tax" upon
employers when they pay deferred compensation.
The special tax proposed in this Article is focused on the taxation
of the employer. In another article, this Author proposed a modest
reform for the taxation of the employee under which the employee
would always pay tax on deferred compensation at the highest marginal
tax rate, thereby avoiding the problem of deferring compensation from
high- to low-bracket tax years. These two proposals (the special rate for
employees and the special tax on employers) would effectively
neutralize any tax advantage for deferred compensation.
Negating the tax advantages of deferral has not, however, been the
goal of past legislation. Section 409 A, as described above, 17 3 negates
no advantage of deferral. Instead, § 409A simply narrows the field of
compensation contracts that can actually achieve deferral.
The
complexity of§ 409A is well known, as is the fact that it fails to achieve
any discemable tax or non-tax policy. Thus, the additional tax proposed
in this Article need not be an additional burden on employers who
maintain deferred compensation plans, as future reforms should
eliminate not only the tax advantages of deferred compensation, but its
unnecessary regulation as well. 174
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
174 Future research on deferred compensation will hopefully shed more light on whether lowtax corporations actually use it to avoid taxation. Getting information about the tax status of
publicly traded employers is actually feasible. See John Graham, Duke University, Tax Rate
Order Form, http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-jgraham/taxform.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010)
(providing an order form for simulated tax rates, which are "a sophisticated estimate of the
corporate marginal tax rate for over 10,000 firms from 1980 through present"). The challenge,
though, is in obtaining data on the actual usage of deferred compensation. Historically, financial
accounting required no accounting for the grant of executive stock options beyond footnote
disclosures and no separate accounting at all for other types of deferred compensation. More
recently, the SEC has started requiring firms to disclose total pay packages (deferred and current)
to their top executives. This information is useful and has been analyzed empirically. See
Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in
Managerial Compensation (N.Y.U. Working Paper No. CLB-06-003, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=l291026. The problem with this research, though, is that top executives
are themselves subject to a different system of taxation than rank-and-file executives. The tax
code essentially forces public corporations to defer the compensation of top executives in order to
172
173
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APPENDIX: BASIS FOR SPECIAL TAX

This Appendix will give more rigorous support for the claim that
the proposed special tax equals the IRS's claim to the interest
component of deferred compensation. Assume that the employer i~
willing to pay the employee Co currently, but instead defers the payment
for N years and agrees to pay CN instead. Also, assume that fee is the
employee's marginal tax rate and that fer is the employer's marginal tax
rate.
As a preliminary matter, note that interest rate r links current and
deferred compensation such that CN = C0erN. The rate r is an after-tax
rate, because it also links the after-tax value of current and deferred
compensation. 175 From the perspective of the employee, the equivalent
before-tax interest rate is r I (1 - fee).

I.

How CuRRENT LAw ADEQUATELY TAXEs
THE COMPENSATION COMPONENT

This Article bifurcates the deferred compensation contract into
wage and debt components. Current law adequately taxes the wage
component. Ideally, the IRS would currently receive a wage component
of Co(tee - fer). Instead, the IRS receives CN(fee - fer) in period N.
Because CN = CoerN is simply the future value of Co, the IRS is kept
whole with respect to the wage component.

II.

HOW THE PROPOSED SPECIAL TAX ADEQUATELY TAXES
THE DEBT COMPONENT

To address the current law's failure to tax the debt component of
deferred compensation, this Article proposed a special tax on the
payment of deferred compensation. 176 The tax is levied on the product
of the amount actually paid (CN), the after-tax interest rate implied by
the parties' deal (r), and the duration of the contract (N). The IRS will
receive tax at a rate equal to the employee's tax rate (tee), but must also
grant a deduction to the employer. Thus, according to this Article's

achieve a deduction. I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2010). What is more relevant to this Article is
whether corporations use deferred compensation to shelter investment income of employees
outside the top-paid group.
175 That is to say, CN(l - t..) = Coe'N (1 - t.,).
176 See supra Part IV.D.
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proposal, the IRS should receive a net claim equal to cNrN (tee - ter) .
The special-tax proposal uses continuous compounding. Let r be
the continuously compounded after-tax interest rate implied by the
deferred compensation contract. Thus, Cr/r = CN. The equivalent
debt/compensation combination is constructed much as before. The
employee receives Co in the current period, pays tax, and loans the aftertax proceeds to the employer. Thus, the initial loan is Co (1 - tee) and
be~rs formal interest of r I (1 - tee). As before, the employer pays cash
interest to the employee to cover her tax bill, but capitalizes the rest.
The loan, therefore, grows at a rate of r. Thus, at any particular time =
x, the outstanding loan balance will be Co (I - lee) erx. The amount of
interest on this loan over a small period of time (dx) is:

On a net basis, the IRS collects tax of Ctee - fer) on this amount,
which must be increased to reflect the time-value of money, as the IRS
is paid only at the end of the loan (time = N). Therefore, the periodic
tax payments are increased by a factor of e(N-xJr. Thus, the IRS's entire
claim to the interest on the loan, payable at the end of the loan, will be:
N

fc e xr re(N-x)r(tee - ter )d
0

_

X-

0

N

JC0 eNrr(tee- ter)dx =
0

CoeNrr(tee -ter)N =
CNrN(tee- teJ

Ill.

THE SPECIAL TAX IN PRESENT VALUE TERMS

Since this Article proposes to levy the special tax upon payment of
deferred compensation, the tax is expressed in future value terms. Some
readers might find the present value to be more significant. The
transformation is simple, as Co is simply the present value of CN. Thus,
for the continuously compounded model, the present value is:

It is also possible to conceptualize this amount as the tax advantage
from deferred compensation under current law.
Phantom stock gives an employee an unsecured right to payment
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based on the value of employer stock. In this Appendix, an employer's
stock is worth S1 at time = j. So, a phantom stock plan payable on a
single share of stock at time = N would provide a pre-tax payment of SN
or an after-tax payment of SN(i-tee).
A critical insight of forward-contract pricing is to equate fixed and
variable cash flows. From an ex ante perspective (i.e., at time = 0), the
payoff from stock (SN) is equivalent to the payoff from a debt of S 0 that
grows over time to S0erN. Thus, the after-tax payoff from phantom stock
is financially equivalent to the after-tax payoff from a fixed deferred
compensation obligation to pay S 0erN at time = N. Because of this
equivalence, it is possible to simply apply the special tax to phantom
stock.
The special tax provides the IRS with a payoff based on the
amount of the fixed obligation. Here, that payoff would be:

Again, it is possible to simplify matters by invoking the
equivalence of fixed and variable payments because the IRS would
receive an equivalent based on the value of employer stock, or:

Thus, the IRS is made whole if the special tax is applied to the payoff
from phantom stock, SN.
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